What went wrong

Records show that the Azad Maidan riots took place between 3.07 pm when the first glass pane of an OB van was broken and 3.47 pm when the situation was brought under control.

Records show that the Azad Maidan riots took place between 3.07 pm when the first glass pane of an OB van was broken and 3.47 pm when the situation was brought under control. Eyewitnesses and media accounts,however,state that the trouble started much before.

A post-riot analysis of the event during a police de-briefing on Tuesday indicates crucial lapse of time between the first stage of ‘discontent’ when the Mumbai Police collectively failed to take note of the crowd of devout Muslims leaving their homes in large numbers,to the second stage of ‘simmering’ when a faulty bandobast plan created hurdles,to the third stage of a ‘flashpoint’ when a closed gate inside Azad Maidan led to the first scuffle,to the last stage of ‘violence’,when the first stone was hurled.

-Background analysis of Raza Academy was not done after Urdu press indicated its support to the protest. The academy,known to be a “good mobiliser” with “poor control” on the crowd,is allegedly responsible for 10 deaths during a protest against Salman Rushdie’s controversial book Satanic Verses and another two in a firing during JJ Marg protest. In Bhiwandi,a law-and-order situation was once orchestrated by the group.

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-Mobilisation and propoganda material like press advertisements,Facebook links and hoardings outside mosques and video parlours were ignored. Urdu press advertisements placed from Thursday to Sunday,indicating a growing list of supporters,were overlooked.

-Videography done by cops at Govandi and conveyed to control room was not taken seriously. The situation on trains and roads to Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST) was not taken seriously. Flags — possible weapons during riots — mounted behind two-wheelers were overlooked.

-Two deputy commissioners of police — Port Zone and Security — entrusted with the task of additional support for bandobast have clarified that their roles were not defined.

-Additional Commissioner Krishna Prakash (South Region) did not have a grip on the issue.

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-The strength of the Reserve Police teams was weak,indicating no anticipation of dissent.

-State Reserve Police Force (SRPF) did not co-ordinate with the local police commander. By the time they swung into action,two women constables and other support staff were attacked.

-No contingency plan was in place. Commissioner of Police Arup Patnaik had to visit the spot after he realised the situation couldn’t be contained by his officers on field. No command chain was followed.

-The lathicharge was haphazard with groups of protesters beaten at spots far away from exits. For the first 10 minutes,instead of dispersing the crowds towards CST,the police forced them to move towards Metro Cinema or inside the ground.

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-The different tier of riot control was placed at all the wrong corners – SRPF was stationed far away,while television vans were allowed to park closest to the gate. The positioning of the graded response was also faulty with tear gas unit kept the farthest.

-Additional Commissioner of Police,South region,was on stage reciting a religious verse,unaware of the scuffle at the access.

-The exit points were not properly strategised. The crowd,barricaded inside,was given exit passage 20 minutes after the riots broke out. A charged crowd not allowed to disperse could have led to a calamity.

-Makeshift control room inside Azad Maidan,giving a good view of the access points,wasn’t used optimally.

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-Protesters were too close to property. Vehicles were parked near the gate,allowing easy access to them.

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