Expert Explains | Maldives-China relations: History, changing dynamics in the present

China-Maldives ties: history

China describes Maldives as a traditionally friendly neighbour, claiming a relationship that goes back several centuries to the Tang dynasty (7th century AD) and to the ancient Silk Road. In more recent times, scholars in China refer to the famous Ming dynasty Chinese navigator, Zheng He, who visited Maldives twice in 1412 and in 1430, respectively. Most Chinese commentaries do not miss to underscore that the Maldivian King Yusof also sent envoys to China on three different occasions, around 1417.

However, in the contemporary era, diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of China and Maldives were established only in 1972. Economic and trade ties between the two countries began in 1981.

Boost under Xi

Though between the late 1990s and in the first decade of this century, Prime Minister Zhu Rongji, apart from a few senior CCP politburo members, visited Maldives, the two countries established a future-oriented comprehensive relationship in 2014, when Xi Jinping became the first Chinese head of state to visit Maldives.

Under Xi, ties progressed rapidly. His new initiative, ‘One Belt, One Road’, became a keyword in their rapid bilateral economic and trade cooperation. Maldives was one of the first South Asian countries to join the OBOR, which is now called the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI).

The newly elected President of Maldives, Mohamed Muizzu, went to Beijing (from January 8-12) soon after coming to power. This visit was celebrated in China as the tenth anniversary of President Xi’s historic visit to Malé in 2014.

‘New beginning’ under Muizzu

Politically speaking, many in China see Muizzu’s visit as path-breaking in several ways. This is for the first time a Maldivian President has chosen China for his first overseas visit instead of India.

Official media and scholars in China have interpreted Muizzu’s visit as a “new and balanced” beginning in Maldives foreign policy. Professor Liu Zongyi, a researcher at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS) and director of the South Asia Research Centre, called the visit a clear signal to China that the Maldives president wants to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the two countries.

In several commentaries, Chinese scholars have also highlighted India’s “undue concerns” and “unease” regarding Muizzu’s China visit. Drawing a direct link between India’s “hegemonic neighbourhood first” policy in the sub-continent, with New Delhi “always suspicious” of Beijing’s “growing economic and friendly cooperation” with South Asian states, these commentaries have dismissed accusations of Beijing indulging in a “zero sum game.”

In a signed piece, Long Xingchun, International Relations professor and the head of Chengdu Institute of World Affairs, wrote: “India views South Asia as its own sphere of influence, demanding that countries in the region, including Maldives, prioritise India in their diplomatic relations. In particular, New Delhi hopes that the Maldives could adopt a confrontational approach toward Beijing.”

Role of the US

At another level, thanks to its strategic location in the Indian Ocean and the India-China tug of war over it, Maldives is fast attracting US attention. In a recent write-up, Michael Kugelman, the Asia Program deputy director and senior associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington, DC observed: “The deepening United States rivalry with China is prompting intensified US engagement with Malé. Newer developments in the western reaches of the Indo-Pacific—including China’s provocations along India’s border in Ladakh and the opening of a Chinese military base in Djibouti—have woken Washington up to the Maldives’s geostrategic significance.”

This explains why five decades after establishing diplomatic ties with Maldives, the US announced the opening of its embassy in October 2020.

Commentary in China about India

Chinanews.com, the official Chinese news service reporting on foreign affairs, emphasised the importance of the upgrading of bilateral relations with Maldives during Muizzu’s visit by simply highlighting “change of one word” in their new status. Before his visit, the bilateral relationship was called “comprehensive friendly cooperative partnership,” and now it has been elevated to “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership,” the Chinese news service reported.

However, the strategic affairs community within China and without is too well-aware of Beijing’s long-term and profound maritime calculations behind what is not at all a mere nomenclature upgrade.

Finally, perhaps as a sign of the growing confidence in Muizzu, Beijing rather candidly commented on India’s perceived annoyance with his China visit. In some commentaries, it was even said the Indian “negative reaction” speaks of New Delhi “lacking confidence in its bilateral ties with Maldives”.

Throughout the five days that Muizzu was in China, in the Chinese state media, news reports carried headlines like “Tense relations between Maldives and India”; “Anti-India Muizzu orders Indian troops withdrawal from Maldives”; and “After returning home from Beijing visit, Muizzu sets 15 March deadline for India,” etc.

Muizzu seems to have made a China-ward tilt, and Beijing seems confident about his policies. Will India manage to reset historical and strategic equations? That remains to be seen.

Hemant Adlakha teaches Chinese at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. He is also Vice Chairperson and Honorary Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies (ICS), Delhi.