Jawed Ashraf at Idea Exchange: ‘Managing foreign policy isn’t just analysis behind closed doors… It now plays out on your phone screen, shaped by people’s voices’

I think the short term tends to overwhelm the long term and our perspectives, especially when we go through a very intense experience. Some
may feel disappointed with the global response, or this narrative of equating the aggressor and the victim, hyphenation and mediation. We will get past this to focus on terrorism.

Pahalgam was not just about terrorism, or Jammu and Kashmir; it really was meant to reinforce the idea of the impossibility of people living together, a war of religions to reinforce the idea of two-nation theory besides the short-term objective of derailing the situation in Jammu and Kashmir at the start of the tourist season.

Our response was inevitable. We have come to this point after a very long journey of trying everything possible bilaterally and internationally. From 2016 onwards, there has been a progressive escalation in our response. Uri happened, we had a surgical strike, Pulwama happened, we had Balakot. It was meant to be a signal for deterrence but now this obviously triggered a kind of response which was perhaps not expected by Pakistan or the international community.

We have achieved our objective and it would be important for the world to understand our position and approach. The first is that we have said that we can take responsibility for our security and that we will take control of the levers of post-attack developments and not wait for international mediation. Second, we are telling the world that we are prepared to use force in order to achieve it, and that there can be no shield of security for terrorists in Pakistan. That we are willing to take acceptable risks and costs. This is beside the hard decisions like the Indus Waters Treaty. As the Prime Minister stated in his address, apart from saying that if you hit, we’ll hit back harder, apart from saying that we will not be deterred by nuclear blackmail, we’ve also said we now erase the distinction between terrorists and state sponsors.

Now we also have to bring terrorism emanating from Pakistan back at the centre of our conversations with the international community, which perhaps because of the great geopolitical shifts, particularly China’s rise and the Indo-Pacific, wasn’t getting the same level of attention, and to make them realise that Pakistan-based terrorism is a problem for them as much as it is for us.

When all-party delegations are going out, it is not the government but the people of India speaking to the world and conveying a message of national consensus and priority on terrorism.

Shubhajit Roy: With the diplomatic steps, India has already exhausted the lower steps of the escalatory ladder. If there is another terror attack, then we are operating from a much higher escalatory ladder level. Where does this lead to?

There has to be strategic ambiguity on this issue. First, what would be the scale, nature and target of a terrorist attack that will trigger a response of this nature from us is going to be something that we don’t declare. Second, the response itself doesn’t have to be of the same kind. There will always be an element of surprise. It could be asymmetric.

‘We have achieved our objective and it would be important for the world to understand our position and approach’

Deterrence is a function of what we achieve on the ground and what we create in the mind of the adversary regarding the current outcome and future resolve. Pakistan appears to have convinced itself about a different outcome and, as in the past, Pakistan may be emboldened to test the new doctrine at some point in the next few years.

We will have to have a much higher level of readiness, and in terms of response time, being able to compress it even further. Technology and new age warfare enable it. It also means that we’ll have to invest more in the right kind of defence capabilities and equipment, while keeping an eye on the north and our increasingly contested seas. Strengthen our capacity to deny success to terrorism. We will have to preserve international economic confidence despite heightened risks. Our diplomacy will have to manage enhanced international concerns
and temptation to mediate between the two countries.

On international support | If we start believing that if we are hit by terrorism from Pakistan, the entire world will come down like a ton of hot bricks on Pakistan, then it is romanticism and naïveté… India needs to build its own capabilities

A key concomitant will be the clarity of deterrence message. At the same time, it may be useful at some point to have some kind of a back-channel with Pakistan to convey our resolve and to minimise the risks of surprises. Major powers do that.

Shubhajit Roy: US President Donald Trump announced the ceasefire and has continued to make statements. What should India do to tackle a very enthusiastic American president who is keen to sort of play the peacemaker’s role?

We are dealing with a President with no precedence in living memory. He has completely upturned the polity and institutional structure of the US. He has also completely changed the terms of US responsibility and role in the world and its engagement with other powers. In his first term, too, President Trump spoke about mediation. What we see is a desire to look for instant successes, to project the impact of his personal power in shaping the course of countries, the idea that everyone is susceptible to pressure and amenable to deal-making and bargains.

Our approach will be not to get trapped in a war of words. It will be institutional and long-term. It has been a consistent Indian position that there is no room for third-party mediation in Jammu and Kashmir. Many would recall late Shri Jaswant Singh’s comment in 2001, that we are two countries that speak the same language, we don’t need an interpreter to speak to each other. We’ll get past this and focus on some of the positive agenda with other countries, including the US.

Shubhajit Roy: Over the last 20 years, recent governments have spent a fair amount of political capital on mobilising a global opinion in India’s favour. Post Operation Sindoor, do you think India has been able to get the world on its side?

It’s a very different world that we live in. It’s a fragmented world. Everyone is preoccupied with their own set of problems. The US itself doesn’t have the will or the capacity to underwrite the international system. China or anyone else is not even close to doing that anyway. We are at a stage where people may agree on the principles and there was universal condemnation of the terrorist attack in Pahalgam. But sympathy, solidarity and support do not always translate into concrete measures. So, when it comes to our military action or when it comes to those countries to take concrete action, that’s where sometimes the drift starts taking place as countries start calculating their own interests.

We have to work on mobilising complete support in terms of understanding what the nature of Pahalgam attack was and the whole history of cross-border terrorism from Pakistan, not just in our bilateral context but its global footprint. We have enough evidence to show that almost every terror attack has some links to Pakistan. We have to absolutely make it clear with solid historical evidence that it has nothing to do with the so-called unresolved issue of Jammu and Kashmir, because that issue predates the rise of rampant terrorism and is fundamental to the self-conception of the State of Pakistan. The Mumbai terror attack and others are evidence of that.

Aakash Joshi: Did India lose the information war?

Whether we have won or lost the information war is a matter of perception and which audience we are talking about. This was the first war we fought in an era of ubiquitous social media and AI. There was a war in a parallel digital universe. It makes perceptions difficult to evaluate. Sometimes we feel that we have only won when the score — in tennis terms — is 6-0. If at times there are views that are contrary to ours, we sometimes overemphasise that point of view, and therefore feel that we have lost this. I have found in my personal experience through decades that the Western media, particularly the Anglo-Saxon media, has not been sympathetic to us generally, notwithstanding who is in power in India.

On Mediation on Kashmir | We are two countries that speak the same language, we don’t need an interpreter to speak to each other. We’ll get past this and focus on some of the positive agenda with other countries, including the US

During this conflict, it was extraordinary that the focus was entirely on the so-called air battle and supposed losses on the Indian side and not on the unprecedented event of nine terror hubs, two of them the most guarded and secure, being hit or the military assets or virtually all air force runways in Pakistan being targeted successfully in our retaliatory response to their military action. I think the perceptions have improved considerably in the last few days. That will also be the key task of the all-party missions. Beyond that, it has to be a sustained campaign.

‘We have to strengthen early stages of counter-terrorism — predictive, preventive, pre-emptive and protective, besides punitive and persuasion (international) to deny success and raise the cost’

But this also points to a longer-term challenge of narrative building and perception management in diplomacy. To me, today, the biggest task of diplomacy is not the traditional roles of political officers or trade officers in embassies abroad but public diplomacy and strategic communication using both human contacts and digital instruments.

Rakesh Sinha: How difficult will it be to deal with Pakistan under Field Marshal Asim Munir? 

Hypothetically, it’s too early but I would say historically, if you see, he may assert his authority, he may even, like his previous field marshal, Ayub Khan, take complete control, take power.

In a world which has become far more driven by realpolitik and pragmatism, that would be accepted. Even in October 1999, when General Musharraf took power, the US was able to reconcile with it very quickly.

Will that lead to a more assertive, aggressive approach towards India, given his hard ideological belief? Or will he try to build some level of normalcy, restore some stability, if not friendship and reconciliation? Musharraf was the architect of Kargil and was in office when major terrorist attacks took place. But he also pursued peace later.

Shahid Pervez: Do you think any battlefield solution could ever resolve the conflict between India and Pakistan?

First, let’s separate India-Pakistan conflict from the focus on terrorism. Experience around the world suggests that terrorism cannot be eliminated by military means alone. There has to be a combination of so many factors. India and Pakistan had disputes going back to 1948, but the experience of terrorism has evolved gradually, and has been perfected as an instrument of state policy over the past four decades starting with Punjab and then it really went into a different level in Jammu and Kashmir.

We have to strengthen early stages of counter-terrorism — predictive, preventive, pre-emptive and protective, besides punitive and persuasion (international) to deny success and raise the cost. Change will happen only if there is a perception in Pakistan that the cost of terrorism is more than the returns from it, and in some way the international community will also have to exert pressure to bring about a change in the internal dynamics in Pakistan.

Can there ever be a resolution of issues between India and Pakistan? Efforts have been made in the past by successive Prime Ministers. I don’t think that any time in the world you should ever think there is no alternative future.

Sukalp Sharma: With Operation Sindoor, there was a lot of overt messaging. What would be more effective are covert operations, to actually eliminate the terror leadership and also have plausible deniability while not actually going up the escalation ladder in military terms. What is your view? 

It’s the responsibility of the government to tell its people you are not helpless, you are not defenceless. That does not mean whatever doctrine the Prime Minister has articulated rules out one or the other or a combination of multiple instruments. The government is not defining what our retaliatory measures will be in the future.

Sukalp Sharma: What should India do in terms of probably convincing the Chinese to decouple from Pakistan in a bilateral relationship, since they supplied weapons to them?

For the first time, we have a major power right on our border with which we also have problems. It’s a unique situation. Clearly, our experience with China has not been a very positive one. As the asymmetry is growing between India and China, their need for accommodation is perhaps less, coupled with the fact that there may be deep-rooted suspicions in China that we may be part of a future alliance to contain China. It sees India as a barrier or an obstacle to its global ambitions. It would want to have a countervailing power against India, which in this case is Pakistan, but it would also try to build similar relationships in our neighbourhood. So we face a problem with China at several levels — from bilateral to economic to geopolitical. We have to keep trying to engage with them, at least to lessen the tensions and reduce mistrust.

At the same time, we need to strengthen our military capabilities in a way that we are prepared genuinely for a two-front situation. Our current defence spending to GDP ratio is very low. Military reforms and modernisation have to be accelerated. A genuinely autonomous and self-reliant Indian defence innovation and industrial base has to be built.

Muzamil Jaleel: In situations like the current heightened India-Pakistan tensions, the Kashmir issue will always be cited. How should the Government address this?

There are two different things we are dealing with. One is the issue with regard to Pakistan, and the other is the issue with regard to the people of Jammu and Kashmir. We have to be able to create a sense of belonging, integration, opportunity, dignity, equality, security, and to be able to advance for them a life of peace and prosperity.

On china |  It would want to have a countervailing power against India, which in this case is Pakistan, but it would also try to build similar relationships in our neighbourhood. So we face a problem with China at several levels

When an incident like this happens, we have to be careful as people not to make the entire population culpable or complicit.

Since 2019, there is progress in economic development and integration, connectivity, education skills, investments, social infrastructure. But there is a larger question of the hearts and minds there.

This time we saw an extraordinary and united response to terrorism from the people of Jammu and Kashmir. It should be a source of great strength for us. Prime Minister Modi spoke about it. This is going to be a long process. It has to be a political process, social process, economic process.

For the long-term solution, though, discussions with Pakistan will be needed. Both tracks — Pakistan and domestic — are required. Timing and sequence are a matter of judgement and strategy.

Saptarshi Basak: Which countries of consequence would you say are truly India’s friends today? 

If you are a country with a DNA of strategic autonomy and a deep belief in independence, then you have to also accept that you won’t have ironclad friends, as China is to Pakistan. Second, there is just no way we will sign up to allow our security to be the responsibility of some other country. Another country that has the same problem is France with its own belief in strategic autonomy. A country with strategic autonomy always stands by itself.

The second point is, we cannot judge friendships only on the basis of one issue, however important it is. People forget that President Trump had praised Pakistan at the State of the Union address for counterterrorism cooperation… If we start believing that if we are hit by terrorism from Pakistan, the entire world will come down like a ton of hot bricks on Pakistan, then it is romanticism and naïveté. Which is why a country like India needs to build its own capabilities, use relationships for that purpose, and maintain its resolve. I think diplomacy relies a lot on rhetoric. The danger lies in believing rhetoric is reality.

Vandita Mishra: Ever since Operation Sindoor, we have constantly been told that foreign policy, security policy is at a different level from domestic politics, that there is a distance between the two and that should be maintained. Do you think under this regime that distinction can be maintained?

I’ve always seen around the world that foreign policy invariably, particularly in democracies, has a bearing on domestic policy, and domestic politics has a bearing on foreign policy. Even at the level of the states. There are a number of occasions where some foreign policy choices have been made based on certain compulsions in states, especially when there are coalition governments.

Many of your policies with regard to your neighbouring countries invariably have a link to the politics in that state. Second, the more integrated you are with the world, the more the domestic politics and foreign policy will get intertwined. The challenge of managing foreign policy and security policy has become even greater because it is no longer restricted to a set of reasoned analysis and arguments that are made behind closed doors with patience and time. It now plays out on your phone screen. It is now shaped on a real-time basis by the voices and the views of people.