Although Jawaharlal Nehru had expressed strong support for the Soviet Union as a prospective anti-colonial ally, his views on the Soviets moderated somewhat after the excesses of Stalinism had started to come to light in the 1930s. “In fact, Nehru assured US Ambassador Loy Henderson in 1950 that ‘in the event of a World War . [India] would not side with the Communists’,” says a recently released book, Vishwa Shastra (Penguin Viking), written by foreign policy analyst Dhruva Jaishankar. An opening (on India-Pakistan dialogue) was created with the election of Narendra Modi as the Prime Minister in 2014, with him inviting the leaders of neighbouring countries to his oath-taking ceremony — a way to start a dialogue with his counterpart in Pakistan — he says in the book. However, on India’s ties with Pakistan during the Manmohan Singh regime, the book says that even though Singh desired a visit to Pakistan, resistance within his own party prevented one from taking place. As India rises, it is increasingly clear that the world matters for its future, says the author, the Executive Director of ORF America, at the outset, citing numbers: diaspora, overseas students, and remittances. Consequently, he also argues why India matters to the rest of the world. Excerpts from an interview: You say in the book that India's future will be largely shaped by its foreign interactions. How is that something new? The book provides plenty of examples of how India has always been shaped in some way by its foreign interactions, whether its lucrative exports of commodities, its religious composition, the structures of its bureaucracy and military, its educational systems, or even the food Indians eat. Consider the examples of the regimental names and cultures in the Indian Army, or more recently the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) originally established with foreign assistance. Looking ahead, the world at large offers both incredible opportunities for India to make itself stronger and more prosperous, but also risks and challenges that will have to be countered and mitigated. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has often said that from being equally distant from everyone, India is now coming to be equally close to everyone. Is that diametrically opposite to Nehru's non-alignment policy? What necessitated this? I would describe the shift — and there is a very real shift — somewhat differently. Despite the normative embrace of Non-Alignment by many Indians, true Non-Alignment was only possible for a brief period between about 1953 and 1962. After that, and especially after 1971, India was aligned with the Soviet Union. Gradually after 1991, circumstances changed. India's economy became more globally integrated, it became less hesitant about using the rhetoric of a rising power, it managed to ‘de-hyphenate' itself from Pakistan, and it began to play a role on a much larger stage, beyond the narrow confines of South Asia. There were periods when these trends accelerated, such as between 1998 and 2008 and again after PM Modi's election in 2014. In the second part on strategy, you talk about how much China’s rise and behaviour today inform almost all aspects of India’s external interactions. Is China among the biggest factors in India’s foreign policy? China is the single biggest factor influencing Indian foreign policy today. This is evident when you observe India's engagement in various regions — in South Asia, in the Indian Ocean, in Southeast Asia, in the Indo-Pacific, with Russia and Pakistan, with Europe and the US, and with Africa — but also when you consider recent shifts in India's trade, technology, and defence procurement policies. The rise of a global power on one's doorstep, one that contests India's territorial integrity and economic well-being, is bound to have transformative effects on one's worldview. It was under P V Narasimha Rao that India established diplomatic relations with Israel and the ASEAN, and initiated a Look East policy. In essence, we see all that playing out today in a bigger way. Yes, some of the big changes began under PM Rao. He also made attempts at stabilising the border with China, including the first in a series of major border management agreements, and made some initial outreach efforts to the US. But on many other matters, he dithered, notably on India's nuclear programme. It was also in subsequent years that the Indian economy took off, affording Rao's successors – Atal Behari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh — the opportunity to do more. It is under PM Modi that India's leaders made their first visits to Israel, that India established a diplomatic mission dedicated to ASEAN, and it deepened security links with countries like Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. India has attempted to reach out to the Global South, even at multilateral forums like the G20. How significant is that engagement? India's outreach was very much a part of global great power competition. The drivers of Global South’s dissatisfaction today include frustrations about insufficient representation at international institutions; concerns about sustainable debt; and fears that food, energy, and health security imperatives have been downplayed by the Global North. These represent aspects of a common Global South agenda, one that also aligns with Indian interests. Another predominant aspect of India's foreign policy is Neighbourhood First. Is it also falling through at some volatile places — Bangladesh, Myanmar, or Pakistan? I don't think Neighbourhood First applies, at present, to Pakistan. In fact, it is Pakistan's years of obstinacy at SAARC that held back South Asian integration. India's smaller neighbours like Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, are all fiercely sovereignty-conscious, experiencing growing nationalism often directed at India, and have alternative partners that include China. Further considerations include the size disparity in India's favour and overlapping ethnicities, and all of this creates structural headaches for India in its approach to its neighbourhood. But upon recognising these features, India can devote greater diplomatic attention to these countries, extend loans and assistance, recast regionalism in a positive light, and improve cross-border connectivity. Such efforts have now been underway for a decade. The test of India's 'Neighbourhood First' is not whether or not there is political volatility among smaller South Asian countries, but if India's engagement and integration can help mitigate political turmoil. The recent visit to India by Maldives' president offers a good illustration, although Bangladesh presents a much sterner test in the months and years ahead.
