Ex-Lt Gen questions Manekshaw’s strategy during 1971 war

“Manekshaw based in Delhi,had little feel of the situation on the ground,” Jacob has claimed in the book.

He claims that Manekshaw had decided not to include capture of Dacca as one of the principal objectives of Indian operations.

“I was flabbergasted…I was at complete loss to understand the concept underlying Manekshaw’s operational thinking,” Jacob says.

“I maintained that it was imperative that we capture Dacca to control the whole of East Pakistan. Gen Manekshaw smiled at me,using his favorite term of endearment,’Jake sweetie,don’t you see that if we take Khulna and Chittagong,Dacca will automatically fall. There is therefore no need to take Dacca,” writes Jacob.

He further mentions how Manekshaw ordered broadcast of a message intercepted from Pakistan Navy,helping them change their wireless codes and leading to a failure of Indian code breaking operations.

“The intercept indicated a rendezvous for river craft at Gupta Crossing on Meghna river. Manekshaw interpreted this to indicate that elements of Pakistan army were attempting to flee to Burma. He ordered Maj Gen Inder Gill (Director,Military Operations) to broadcast that he knew what they (Pakistani) were up to at Gupta Crossing,” Jacob writes.

“The broadcast was made and the Pakistan Navy immediately changed their code. Subsequently we were unable to read any further naval wireless traffic,” he adds.

Jacob further says,Manekshaw was “convinced” that China would attack India while no movement of Chinese troops was seen on the Tibetan Plateau and the intercepts of Chinese radio traffic also did not indicate any such plan by them.

“Manekshaw was convinced that the Chinese would attack,a view he held right up to December 8,1971,” writes Jacob.

On Manekshaw’s relations with other service chiefs Jacob writes,”Unfortunately,the equation between the Army and Air Force Chiefs at Service Headquarters was less than cordial. The Army and Air Force Chiefs were not on speaking

terms.”

On his equation with the then IAF Chief,Air Chief Marshal (ACM) P C Lall,Jacob says Manekshaw declined to talk to Lall on redrawing the boundaries of IAF commands at Shillong and Allahabad to ensure a better coordinated air raids on Pakistani posts in Bangladesh.

Besides Manekshaw,Jacob has written about then Eastern Army Commander and his immediate senior Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora.

Referring to an incident when Manekshaw heavily criticised the Commanders believing they performed poorly in expediting Mukti Bahini operations in their sectors,Jacob writes,”The formation Commanders junior to him were aghast to see Aurora take the tray from waiter and serve drinks to D P Dhar (Prime Minister’s adviser on Bangladesh) and Manekshaw.”

Jacob further alleges that Manekshaw ordered to change D-Day,when Indian forces were ordered to launch attacks on Pakistani positions inside Bangladesh,to December 4 as four was his ‘lucky’ number.

On an amphibious operation ordered by Manekshaw without prior intimation at Cox’s Bazar to prevent Pakistani forces escaping to Burma,the book says,”The operations

ordered by Manekshaw,based on his assessment that Pakistani forces were withdrawing to Burma down the Arakan road,was a baseless conjecture not supported by any intelligence.”

“These specialised operations should not be mounted and launched in the cavalier manner ordered by Manekshaw in the name of the chiefs of staff at Delhi,” Jacob writes.

The author has also elaborated the personality clashes between the officers,including Manekshaw and Aurora,which “adversely affected the passage of orders and their implementation”.

“Aurora did not get on with Mohan Thapan who was commanding 33 Corps in North Bengal; they were not on speaking terms. Aurora wanted a cinema to be named after him at the 33 Corps HQ and Thapan had refused,” he writes.

“Another Corps commander,General-Officer-Commanding (GOC) 4 Corps Lt Gen Sagat Singh and Aurora initially got on well but relations deteriorated when Aurora learnt that Manekshaw disliked Sagat Singh,” he says further.

According to Jacob,Aurora got on well with the 2 Corps Commander Lt Gen ‘Tappy’ Raina who was on good terms with group of advisers close to Indira Gandhi.

Manekshaw disliked the upright and outspoken Maj Gen Gurbax Singh Gill,the competent GOC of 101 Communication Zone,which led to Aurora turning hostile towards this officer.

Lt Gen Raina had little or no control over his subordinate Maj Gen Dalbir Singh,the GOC of 9 Infantry Division,who openly flouted his orders.

Lt Gen Sagat Singh did not get on well with two of his subordinate divisional commanders,Maj Gen B F Gonsalves and Maj Gen R D Hira of 57 and 23 Mountain Divisions respectively,Jacob says.

He also writes about Manekshaw’s professional relations with officers in Army Headquarters.

“At Army HQ relations between Manekshaw and Maj Gen K K Singh,Director of Military Operation (DMO) till September 1971,were cordial. K K Singh was replaced by Maj Gen Inder Gill as acting DMO. Gill was an upright,competent,and outspoken officer,not a ‘Yes’ man,like others who Manekshaw liked to have around,” he says.

“Manekshaw wanted to appoint Maj Gen Vir Vohra,who was one of his coterie and was at that time attending a course in United Kingdom. Gill did not see eye to eye with Manekshaw on the strategy and objectives spelt out in the operational instructions of Army HQ,” he adds.

Jacob also mentions how both Manekshaw and Aurora were denied important posts in the central government by Gandhi.

“Aurora approached Mrs Indira Gandhi,seeking to be appointed a governor. She declined. He then approached the Akali government in the Punjab,and they later arranged a seat for him in the Rajya Sabha,” he mentions.

According to him,Manekshaw had requested Gandhi to be appointed as the deputy chairman of the Planning Commission and seemed depressed when denied.

“On one of my trips to Delhi,I went to see Manekshaw was staying in the MES Inspection Bungalow. He was sitting alone on the lawn and seemed depressed. He told me that he had requested Mrs Gandhi to appoint him deputy chairman of the Planning Commission,and that she had declined,offering him the post of High Commissioner to Canada instead,” he writes.