5 min to Doomsday Clock: Blix

‘‘I am pleading for the Iraqis to enter the cooperation on substance, Blix said, adding that ‘‘we we do not have the same determination on substance as we have on process.’’

He said there was still time for Iraq to reveal any banned weapons it may have or to give evidence about how they were destroyed. Iraq, he said, needed to ‘‘give us hope.’’

‘‘We all know the situation is serious,’’ Blix said about a US military attack. ‘‘I don’t think the decision is final. I don’t think that the end is there, that the date has been set, but I think that we are moving closer and closer to it.’’

‘‘And therefore it seems to me that the Iraqi leadership must be well aware of that,’’ Blix said.

‘‘Isn’t there five minutes to midnight in your political assessment?’’ he asked.

The expression derives from a ‘‘Doomsday Clock’’ the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists has kept since 1947 to gauge chances of a nuclear war. It reached two minutes to midnight in 1953 and in February 2002 was reset from nine to seven minutes to midnight, reflecting US Withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, among other factors.

Blix said the responses he had seen from Iraqi officials did not indicate Baghdad was prepared to hand over critical information omitted in its 12,000-page arms declaration submitted on December 7.

Iraq, he said, had to assure Security Council members that ‘‘it will actively seek and present any items or programs which are proscribed or else if they are not there, to seek and present credible evidence for their absence.’’

For example, he suggested a commission of inquiry Iraq organised after inspectors discovered a dozen chemical warheads last month be given more power to look for any materials relating to biological weapons also.

On Powell’s address, Blix said he assumed the Secretary of State would not be indicating sites that the inspectors should visit that he had not revealed earlier.

‘‘It is more likely to be based upon satellite imagery and upon intercepts of telephone conversations or knowledge about Iraqi procurement of technical material or chemicals,’’ Blix said.

But in answer to questions, Blix said he had reports but noevidence of the mobile laboratories as the US has said. He also disputed allegations from some US officials that his teams leaked information to Iraq.

Another example he gave was on Iraq’s trying to import aluminum tubes, which the US repeatedly said were for the purpose of enriching uranium. Blix said there were still ‘‘differing views’’ and that the controversy no longer ‘‘had the same kind of certitude as at the beginning’’. (Reuters)