The army recently conducted a ‘‘brainstorming’’ with its former chiefs led by the unmatchable Sam Manekshaw of the “put your hands in your pocket and think of Sam” advice to soldiers advancing on the western front in 1971. Everyone had a good time but the ‘‘professional’’ content of the gathering merits some discussion.The main purpose of this meeting was to apprise the old timers of what the present-day army was doing and to seek their views on what else needed to be done. This, itself, was quite strange and Manekshaw set forth his position bluntly. He never took anyone’s advice, he declared, and was not about to give his own. Possibly, most of the others present subscribed to this same view. Once retired, people get distanced from reality quickly. And to expect that several years down the line, they will be able or keen to participate meaningfully in professional debate, is optimistic. This is especially so in the realm of military warfare where technology is driving strategies at a frenetic pace. So, the more important question to be answered is if the army of today knows, as the Cheshire cat asked Alice, where to go.Take the army’s new doctrine. In an environment in which threats of traditional military conflicts across land frontiers are diminishing, the focus of our land force, as spelt out in this operational philosophy termed Cold Start, continues to be dominated by the old mindsets of land battles in which territory would be seized and later become the determinant in post war trade-offs. The doctrine calls for Integrated Battle Groups, which would conduct ‘‘high intensity operations’’, but this is exactly what we have done, or tried to do, in the last several wars, save Kargil. There is emphasis only on more modern equipment, greater mobility, and some regrouping of forces but the overarching philosophy is essentially the same. The ‘‘new’’ approach fails to recognise the compulsions of the emerging environment in which a unipolar world is imposing constraints on traditional military options, even as non-traditional threats become more important.One would have expected the army’s new doctrine to respond to this challenge and to outline the manner in which both would be managed. Merely decrying the prolonged use of military force in ‘‘aid to civil power’’ does not serve any purpose. It will have to be an important commitment, and strategies must be evolved to cope with traditional as well as non-traditional threats. The new doctrine does not reassure on this count. Finally, in an era where joint and integrated military capabilities are imperatives to success, our land forces continue to believe that they can manage things on their own. Even where some measures consistent with the needs of the new environment are contemplated, execution has been far from satisfactory. Creation of Special Forces falls in this category. Originally conceived as an entirely separate and dedicated force, they are now deployed as glorified infantry. This is akin to using highly trained NSG commandos for VIP security. There is now talk of increasing these forces from five battalions, as at present, to 13. Brushed aside is the fact that the total number of such forces available in our country with the army, navy, the NSG, and, more recently, the air force, exceeds the numbers that are there in the US. Looking for more manpower is absurd when every rational analysis suggests that our land forces must shed at least a quarter of a million men if they are to become ‘‘lean and mean’’.Without such reduction, the army can never achieve modernisation. There is also insufficient recognition of the kind of military strength the country requires to become a regional power beyond the confines of South Asia. In the first fifty years of its existence, India’s major security concerns revolved around the integrity of its land frontiers. Times are changing. India is poised to become one of the four major economies of the world by 2020. In this same time frame, it will become the fourth largest importer of oil. As the economy grows, so will its dependence on oil and on overseas trade. Two decades ago, that trade measured at less than 8 per cent of the GDP. Today, it has crossed 17 per cent. By 2020, this figure would have reached nearly 40 per cent. In this same period, oil imports would have grown to 300 million tons from the existing 85 million tons. It should be clear to anyone that the focus of India’s security interests is slowly, but unmistakably, shifting seawards. Its concerns now stretch across the North Indian Ocean, from the Gulf and East African coast to the Asean countries, and include the Central Asian Republics and the totality of our military power, on land, at sea and in the air, must be able to respond to them.To predicate the country’s security concerns on the threat from Pakistan, as the army continues to do, is disadvantageous to the national interest. Not only does this mentality ensure that our land power will never become what it needs to be in keeping with India’s emerging power and aspirations, but it also hinders development of other capabilities that are needed. This is time for introspection at army headquarters. To go back to the Cheshire cat, you must know where you want to go.The writer has served as director general, Defence Planning Staff
