A general Appraisal

In foreign relations, Musharraf’s scorecard was mixed, although cumulatively it accelerated public disapproval and his departure. On Iraq, he took a stand in not supporting America in the security council when it wanted a resolution to invade Iraq, and he resisted repeated calls from the US and the UK for troops for Iraq. On the nuclear issue the West, never comfortable with a Muslim nuclear power and with its double standard, which had ignored France giving nuclear capability to Israel, seized on the opportunity to criticise and pressure Pakistan. Musharraf strongly resisted this pressure and supported his nuclear negotiators, following the precedent set by his predecessors.

On India and Kashmir, despite his legacy of Kargil and disappointment in Agra, Musharraf persevered and together with his Indian interlocutors succeeded in reducing tension through the peace process, correctly assessing there was no alternative and no post-9/11 international acceptability of an armed insurrection in Indian Occupied Kashmir. However, his out of the box proposals on Kashmir, which could only have led to a settlement on Indian terms, perceptually eroded Pakistan’s principled support for the UN Security Council right of the Kashmiris for self determination, despite Foreign Office attempts to compensate. Probably he felt that resolving Kashmir would be his crowning achievement. He did not credit continuing indigenous Kashmiri resilience, which as in 1989, has again vigorously resurfaced.

While the broad lines of policy towards India will remain with an expansion of mutually beneficial trade relations, there should be a recognition that better relations do not have to be at the cost of the Kashmiri people and our principled stand. Cross-LoC confidence building measures can still be increased. Drumming up support against India’s human rights violations and oppressive occupation remains a credible bilateral and international option only as long as cross-border infiltration continues to be curbed.

His reaction to American demands after 9/11 defined Musharraf in Pakistani eyes. Admittedly his options were limited, but he surprised the Americans by accepting all their demands, with no attempt to strike a better bargain. Yes, American economic assistance, backed by its Western allies and the IFIs, plus sizeable military assistance poured in. The cost was much higher. An old Punjabi proverb has it that he who has been fed by another, cannot look him in the eye. Whatever Pakistani officials may claim about the money given being for payment of military operations to support the coalition in Afghanistan, and that they will fight terrorism in their own way, the American response is that they gave the money and thus want results.

Musharraf, despite having all powers, did not do enough for women’s rights, ignored public education and was not able to reverse the deteriorating law and order situation, let alone growing militancy. The rising unpopularity of the coalition’s campaign in Afghanistan and consequent resistance fuelled not only sympathy and support from across the border, but when this was countered by Pakistani military action and American air strikes, it led to a blowback effect in Pakistan, and public lack of support for this pro-America policy.

While there may now be some change of nuance on the war on terror to demonstrate some distance from American dictation, the fragile economy may not immediately permit much substantive change. Though terrorism has to be fought, a military campaign against one’s own people in the critically underdeveloped tribal areas, similar to that of the coalition foreigners operating in Afghanistan in a manner inconceivable in their own countries, is not sustainable. No ordinary Pakistani soldier considers a tribesman sympathetic to fellow tribals under attack in Afghanistan, an enemy.

The freedom of manoeuvre for any government in Pakistan will depend on its ability to balance the budget to free itself of external assistance. Improving governance, austerity, fiscal discipline, encouraging exports and concentrating on education and public infrastructure, all long ignored by the Musharraf and previous regimes, must be its priorities, if it wants to survive mounting public discontent at rising inflation, food and energy prices.

Pakistan is a country with vast human and material potential crying out for able and consistent leadership. An assertive civic society, coupled with a vigorous and investigative media, demanding accountability at all levels, has now become the dominant characteristic of Pakistan’s polity; this development, which can only be ignored by political parties (which must institute democratic election procedures themselves) at their own peril, provides hope for Pakistan’s future.

The writer is a retired Pakistani diplomat