New Delhi undoubtedly faces a defining moment as it moves towards taking a final decision about whether or not to send a military-led stabilisation force to Iraq. It is extremely important that we make the right decision, and for the right reasons. It is obvious that we must not send a stabilisation force because some lucrative contracts may come our way. The very idea of risking the lives of our jawans for such a goal is humiliating, to say the least. Nor should we agree to sending forces in the hope that this would please Washington. India was unhappy with the way a unilateralist war was waged; and this was clearly conveyed by the parliamentary resolution. But the UN Security Council resolution 1483 after the war spells out the framework of its mandate clearly: It recognises the US as the “authority”, and calls upon all countries to contribute to stabilising Iraq and providing humanitarian assistance.
It would be desirable to take a final decision on sending a stabilisation force to Iraq on the basis of bipartisan support. It can be argued that such a force would have an UN mandate even under the present resolution. But the issues go beyond such technicalities. The central concern is whether we should assist the people of Iraq at this hour of acute challenge or not? Our historical relationship with that country, our belief in our actions as a responsible major power, the urgent need to help restore the dignity, peace and self-confidence of the Iraqis, besides a host of other reasons, demand that we send a stabilisation force to Iraq. What we need to ensure is adequate autonomy in carrying out our commitment, and precautions to minimise any negative fall-out from such an action.
Since there is no legitimate Iraqi government, what New Delhi needs to do urgently, before taking a final decision on the issue, is to send a multi-disciplinary task force to Iraq for an on-the-spot assessment of the situation. Such a group should talk to community leaders to discuss their reactions to our involvement, understand challenges and examine the options available to restore peace, security and stability to Iraqi society at the earliest. In any case, the stabilisation force would need their co-operation subsequently, especially if and when things start to foul up somewhere. More important, such a step would send a clear message that our primary concerns are the people of the country, the restoration of their rights and the rebuilding of their country, without bias toward any group or pre-judgement about the challenges they face. There will be problems and many difficult times ahead. But this should not deter us from discharging our responsibility in tune with the needs of the people of Iraq.