All the netaji’s men

The Hota Committee’s recommendations for reform of the civil services has to be seen in the above context. The report is said to be under scrutiny of another committee in the Cabinet Secretariat. The recommendations are generally unexceptionable; whether they are implementable is another question. The weakness, as I see it, of the Hota report relates to non-recognition of the deep interface between our political process and the rot in our administration. This issue cannot be solved till there is reform of the political process itself. Mere change of the dramatis personae would only have cosmetic impact.

Stable tenure in postings is one long-standing recipe, reiterated by Hota. But, will the political masters, especially in the States, allow officers to complete a full tenure of three or five years in a post? The lucrative transfer industry flourishes in most States, and generally yields two crops annually. What will stability of tenure do to the pressure groups and vested interests in every district? As governments come and go with regularity at relatively short intervals, won’t the new minister want his own man? Will he trust a man appointed by his predecessor?

The other significant suggestion of Hota is that the corrupt officers should be thrown out and their illegally obtained properties confiscated. But, who will bell the cat when the masters themselves are corrupt? And how does such peremptory action tackle the problem of enquiries themselves being rigged to persecute honest officers?

The national media has recently highlighted some of the steps towards reform. These include recruitment age, selection process, use of specialists and some others. Contrary to popular belief, the civil services still attract talented individuals, some of the best available in the country. That they become supine, listless, self-centred and carry a negative attitude is substantially a part of the baggage that they acquire after entry, and should not be laid at the doors of the recruitment policy. It is a failure of our system to utilise the civil services properly.

However, there is still a strong case for reducing the maximum age for recruitment to 24, which would improve considerably the quality of intake. We should not however swing to the other extreme to try to ‘‘catch ’em young’’, by recruiting potential administrators as they leave high school. After all, we are not recruiting potential athletes for the Olympic games. Most children leaving high school do not have sufficient maturity to make up their minds if they wish to be life-long administrators, to the exclusion of other opportunities.

There is the other suggestion, sometimes seen in the papers, to replace the present selection board for senior posts with ‘‘outside experts’’. There is no harm, and indeed there will be benefits if suitable outside expertise is utilised in personnel management. But to replace the present selection structure with a brand new process transplanted from outside will do more harm than good. The malaise is not so much in the interpretation of the annual character rolls of the personnel, as with the very process of writing the annual remarks in respect of each officer, by his own bureaucratic and political superiors. That is the core of the problem that needs to be addressed.

The specialist vs generalist debate is perennial; it resurfaces periodically. I have seen a chief of the Electricity Board, an excellent engineer who managed his power plants and transmission systems extremely well, totally clueless in matters relating to power policy. I have seen a first rate irrigation chief engineer taking over as Secretary of the irrigation department and floundering from day one, on administrative issues. On the other hand, I have seen scientists, long abdicating their scientific work turn into fine administrators and policy-makers. I have also seen IAS secretaries, with excellent reputation, unable to find their feet in alien departments.

My own experience is that there is no hard and fast rule in such matters. I believe that at present, roughly half of the jobs at the level of secretary in the Government of India are held by so called ‘‘specialists’’ and the other by all-India service officers. This is not a bad balance really. I have found that the suitability and background of each officer for a post is more relevant than his label. Certainly, I would hesitate to place any officer at secretary or additional secretary level in any department unless he or she has had some previous exposure to that or an allied department — one gets no time to learn the basics at that level.

If we have to face the reality of our existing milieu, the key to quality governance lies rather in concepts like transparency, opening up of the economy, fewer regulations but strict enforcement, larger role for NGOs and less government in general. In any event, if core issues cannot be addressed for political compulsions, there is no point tinkering with the periphery. The present PM, who commands universal respect and has a insider’s view of what is required is best placed to unravel this knot.

The writer is former cabinet secretary and author of the book, Journeys Through Babudom and Netaland