An Army of destructive creativity

The Indian Army, a million strong now, saw major expansions after the 1962 war and the process continued well after the 1965 and 1971 opera...

The Indian Army, a million strong now, saw major expansions after the 1962 war and the process continued well after the 1965 and 1971 operations. But the growth was haphazard and lopsided to such an extent that defence planners realised in early 1990 that every 14th man in the Army belonged to the services. The tail had come to outweigh the teeth.

With the advent of the global economy, war became a distant possibility. So the government put the squeeze on the Army — the biggest spender among the services. The Army, in its turn, realised that it could not modernise without pruning force levels. It would have been far better if this necessity had come out of operational considerations, which certainly call for major structural changes. The Army has already conducted three major studies. All have identified problem areas, but in isolation and with perceptible traces of regimental bias.

A holistic survey would have revealed one major, non-negotiable term of reference — personnel reduction. India does not need an Army of more than seven lakh. The Indian Army is the fourth largest in the world. Besides, paramilitary forces are also available in considerable strength. Close, unbiased scrutiny is warranted to review manpower requirements at the unit level. It is possible to shed five per cent from all units without the slightest degradation of operational efficiency. With better education, more structured and modern training techniques and sophisticated weapons systems, the emphasis should be on modernisation — less manpower, more lethal arsenal, progressive leadership. A lean, mean Army.

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At present, there are nearly 50 regimental centres. The infantry has on an average one regimental training centre for each group, located indiscriminately. All centres impart identical basic training and are manpower-intensive. It would be more prudent to establish not more than 15 regional regimental centres. There may be 5-7 centres for infantry, one for armoured, one for artillery, one each for air defence artillery, engineers and signals and 3-5 for services. Centres for services can be located at strategic locations and given the additional role of operational logistics.

All centres should be equipped to impart basic military training. Recruits should be sent on to various arms and services schools of instruction.

The Army recently concluded a study on the reduction of Non Field Force (NFF) comprising static units and Headquarters. This study would have been more relevant if its scope had been enlarged to include the active formations which the NFF supports. At most stations, Army, Air Force and Navy establishments coexist with almost identical roles. It is possible to integrate them and task one establishment only to look after the three services.

Most armies of the advanced countries have gone in for privatisation of customer services, and with good reason. In India, privatisation of guest houses and transit facilities has been successfully done by DRDO, divesting the Army of avoidable non-professional responsibilities. The Army must concentrate on professionalism and leave the rest to someone else. Some of the areas in which privatisation can make a difference are station offices, messes, supply of rations, clothing, medical facilities and use of transport in static establishments. Another field where privatisation can make a difference is ordnance depots and factories. Most of them procure their indented items from domestic and foreign industry. They pile up huge, unmanageable inventories. They invariably slip up on delivery schedules and end up with balancesheets in the red.

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India needs a professional Army, not a herd of greenhorns. It is absolutely absurd to think of half-baked, half-cooked solutions. It would be catastrophic to convert regular units into Territorial Army (TA) units for reasons of economy.

Economic liberalisation and information technology, which are here to stay, preclude the possibilities of all-out war. We need an Army which is capable of projecting strategic deterrence and the will of the nation. What is required is `destructive creativity’ — a complete restructuring.

The writer is a retired Brigadier