The LTTE's surprise demolition work in July last year on the isolated Sri Lankan Army's (SLA) coastal brigade-size garrison of Mullaittivu was hailed as the Tigers' biggest military victory and the government's greatest debacle of the 14-year-long Eelam war.Tiger supremo Prabkaharan had vowed to avenge the loss of Jaffna. The SLA was expecting the revenge attack at Weli Oya, the historical bone of contention. Tamils consider Weli Oya to be an intrusive Sinhalese settlement bolstered by a military camp entrenched between the northern and eastern provinces to break the geographical contiguity of a united northeastern province. This is one of the thorniest points of the devolution package accompanying a political resolution of the ethnic problem.The Weli Oya camp is the key flashpoint and has been attacked several times by the Tigers. The SLA considers it the most hazardous of all its garrisons. Before it launched operations to liberate Jaffna, it had to vacate many smaller camps in the east to muster troops for the northern offensive, inviting the opposition United National party (UNP) charge that the Chandrika Kumaratunga government was giving up territory retaken from the Tigers.The UNP was never in favour of stirring up a hornet's nest in Jaffna. It preferred containment in the north and total control of the east. Chandrika reversed this by operating both fronts. It was in deference to the charge of surrendering ground to the LTTE that the government did not accept the SLA's recommendation to vacate Mullaittivu before the Tigers did it for them.Weli Oya symbolises the government's determination. In the last three years, the Tigers have launched major assaults on Weli Oya by land and sea.The last was a colossal disaster as the Army got wind of it.Like any conventional force, the SLA has to keep switching forces to achieve superiority at a time and place of its own choosing. This entails vacating posts. Earlier this year it vacated Pooneryn - which ranks high on its debacle list - and invited the wrath of the Tigers on the Paranthan crossroads post along the A9 Kandy-Jaffna highway.Operation Sure Victory, launched on May 13, billed as the SLA's biggest offensive, is tasked to clear and secure this lifeline to Jaffna. Eelam war watchers had expected the Army to develop Sure Victory to complete the consolidation of its conquest of the north by opening up a land route through the heart of Tiger territory to the north after a link-up of forces advancing simultaneously from the north at Kilinochchi and from the south in Vavuniya.Two divisions are taking part in the operation. For a change it is the Army, not the LTTE, which has bowled a googly. It launched its major thrust from the south but instead of advancing as expected from Kilinochchi, its elite special forces kicked off from Weli Oya and captured Nedunkeni, 30 km southwest. This attack was staggered from the offensive in the south.This surprise seizure of Nedunkeni on May 18 will open a land route to the beleaguered Weli Oya garrison once the two columns link up either at Pullayankulam or Nedukeni.The advance from Weli Oya was easier and quicker than the 10 km move to Omantal, where the troops faced heavy resistance, culminating in the crippling counterattack by the Tigers on the Thandikulam firm base and the Periyamadu artillery fire base on the southern front.The Weli Oya-Nedukeni operation has masked the Mullaittivu stronghold of Prabhakaran and will seriously interfere with the movement of Tigers in the Wanni jungles. But the Army will be unable to trap Prabhakaran in his camp, called Base 14. The Army has many more milestones ahead - reducing Pullayankulam, Kanakaryankulam, Mankulam and Kokkuvi - before it can join forces with Kilinochchi, 60 km away.The war will go on, with the Tigers being presented fresh targets along the new supply route.They have already struck twice in one week in the east at Trincomalee and Amparai where the Army is weak. The offensive appears to have been stalled despite official disclaimers.Chandrika Kumaratunga intends to address the Tigers at a future round of talks from a position of strength. Unfortunately for her, Sure Victory can neither be sure nor a complete victory as it will stretch the Army to breaking point.The author is a retired Major-General
