Assad’s legacy

A new phase of uncertainty begins in the Middle East with the death of one of the region's oldest leaders, the reclusive and hardline Hafe...

A new phase of uncertainty begins in the Middle East with the death of one of the region’s oldest leaders, the reclusive and hardline Hafez al Assad, president of Syria for the last 30 years. Any leader who has dominated the politics of his country as thoroughly and for as long as Assad did is bound to leave a vacuum behind him. But for all the extraordinary power he wielded in his lifetime, in his death Assad has left his country in a deeply unsettled state. Major areas of public life are in flux. The economy is in a mess, the army in decline, his foreign policy in tatters, and the political transition uncertain. It is characteristic of many of the strong-man regimes of the Middle East that there are no established processes for the political transition to a new political leadership.

Although not declared monarchies like Jordan’s where the institution provides for a crown prince to succeed to the throne, in many big countries like Syria, Iraq, Egypt, the sons of sitting presidents are groomed for thepresidency and insinuated into the power structure. But the outcome can be unpredictable.

Assad’s eldest son, Bashar, was expected to take his father’s place eventually but is underage just now, according to the country’s constitution, for the president’s post. Nor has he had time to develop a solid power base. However, with Syria’s power brokers moving swiftly to amend the constitution and install him as the new president and chief of the army, the succession is assured for the time being. Tears shed in the streets of Damascus and in Parliament attest to the senior Assad’s popularity, a valuable asset for Bashar as he tries to consolidate his position. Even so the new leader faces formidable challenges.

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As a member of the minority Alawite community which has exercised power out of proportion to its numbers for the last three decades, he must expect challenges to emerge from the majority Sunni community sooner rather than later. As the candidate of the establishment he will be under pressure to stick to his father’s policies even though in the economic sphere and in foreign policy Syria desperately needs a dramatic reversal of those policies. If his policy options are severely circumscribed by the status quoists, Syria is unlikely to make progress on any front and its leaders would then run the risk of having to perpetuate themselves in power through repressive means.

Bashar, who himself headed an anti-corruption drive, knows that without a major clean-up and reduction of bureaucratic control the Syrian economy will get poorer. He needs resources to rebuild an army that has had no new equipment since Syria’s chief mentor, the Soviet Union, shut shop ten years ago. Syria cannot afford to be judged weak in the region on the basis of traditional indices of power: internal cohesion, economic growth and military strength. Vis-a-vis Israel, Bashar is stuck with his father’s tough line but has no leverage.

Israel’s total withdrawal from Lebanon has robbed Damascus of crucial bargaining power and it can no longer offer peace on the border in return for the whole of Golan. Meanwhile, the demand grows for Syria’s own troop withdrawals from Lebanon. Tough days lie ahead.