Be tough, be creative

Most wars this century have started with the illusion that military engagements can be limited. But these engagements can be limited, paradoxically, only when one side has overwhelming force. It is then easy to secure military objectives without risking unwanted escalation. But in cases where the balance of conventional forces is not lopsided, escalation is all but inevitable. Militarily speaking, we are not in the position Americans are vis-a-vis pretty much anybody other than Russia or China; nor does Israel’s military attempts to crush Hamas hold any sanguine lessons for us.

Ordinary citizens are often not in a position to second-guess military realities. But the callousness with which we lose aircraft, the inordinate delays in defense purchases, all suggest that we have never been serious either about our military preparedness or the lives of our soldiers. Any military engagement with Pakistan, as Kargil demonstrated, will not be a technological razzamatazz, as many in Delhi seem to believe. It will rather be, as Kargil demonstrated, a war with substantial casualties. Just play out this scenario: Imagine we lose even a couple of aircraft, or a few of our soldiers are taken prisoner or, worse still, as is likely to happen, a few bodies are paraded inside Pakistan. What is going to be our response? Will we simply sit back and lick our wounds, satisfied that some remote military objective has been achieved? Or, will we be unable to resist escalation?

To be alarmed by this prospect is not an act of pusillanimity. Rather, we ought to be aware, that no matter what the provocation, no matter how righteous the indignation, war ought not to be undertaken lightly or in a fit of absent-mindedness. Or, worse still, war ought not to be conducted under the illusory promise that euphemisms like “limited war” hold out. If India engages in significant military action there will be no such thing. The prospect of two nuclear powers going to war, in one of which, by our own reckoning, jehadis call the shots, is too alarming a prospect, for all but the most callous.

But suppose for a moment that this apocalyptic dynamic does not come to pass, that we manage to achieve “limited military objectives.” Will we have made ourselves more secure? Will terrorism simply vanish? Again, it is a truism of 20th century warfare that ultimately terrorism can be defeated only by political means. All that our limited military objectives will do is strengthen the political hands of the jehadis. Terrorism has this peculiar advantage that it takes relatively fewer resources and even fewer people to create an escalating cycle of violence, and terrorist outfits, be it in Northern Ireland or in the Middle East, are quick to reassemble under different guises if the political and social circumstances in the societies from which they come are propitious. I doubt any military action is in a position to eradicate the supply of terrorists, and I doubt that any military action can prevent terrorism from moving from Kashmir to other parts of India.

Fortifying yourself as much as possible to combat terrorism is one thing; risking war under the illusion that war eliminates terrorism is quite another. Terrorism has the unique ability to thrive on defeat. I just cannot imagine that even if we achieve our objectives in Kashmir, any future Pakistani regime will not continue to incite violence. There is no solution to cross-border terrorism unless Pakistan’s internal dynamics alter or unless the dynamics of nationalism in the subcontinent as a whole take on a different hue. Any war is unlikely to further these causes.

Risking war will also play into the hands of the jehadis in more ways than one. Not only will it rally greater support for their cause inside Pakistan, it will invite even greater American involvement in the region. By its very nature, American involvement is beneficial for Pakistan. In the name of avoiding apocalyptic scenarios of a dismembered Pakistan and securing predictability on the command and control of nuclear weapons, Americans will continue to strengthen Pakistan’s military establishment. Or, if Kashmir is converted into a military flashpoint, there will be even greater pressure upon us to change the status quo. In an odd kind of way, the jehadis have realised that they do not have the military means to achieve their objectives; the only way in which the status quo can be altered is through inviting greater American intervention. The only consequence of war will not be to make the world wake up to the duplicities of the Pakistani regime on terrorism, it will be to put greater pressure on India to yield something to facilitate a longer-term solution.

We should also not lose sight of the fact that continuing attacks notwithstanding, our restraint and good citizenship have been winning the war against terrorism. It has at least diminished the attractions of terrorism within Kashmir, delegitimised much of the insurgency and acceptable elections now seem like a distinct possibility. Even a couple of years ago all this would have appeared a pipedream. We have to take every possible action to make the international community bear down hard on Pakistan, we must take all possible steps to prevent violence, and we must fortify our democratic resolve to politically isolate terrorism within Kashmir and elsewhere. But risking potentially catastrophic military escalation by sacrificing prudence to indignation, by falsely convincing ourselves that terrorism has a military solution will put in jeopardy our moral, political and strategic interests.

(The writer is professor of philosophy and of law and governance, JNU)