US forces have captured the Baghdad International Airport and will soon be poised to take on the main target: Baghdad and the regime. The outer defences of the capital from the southern side have been totally breached with all the three Republican Guard divisions virtually out of action. Reports indicate that curiously Baghdad seems quite unprepared to defend itself. There have been a few suicidal attacks on US forces, but most were blasted off with the massive firepower of the Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles. Occupation and consolidation of control over the airfield complex would provide the US forces with the ability to directly bring in supplies and forces by air. As the US forces tighten their grip on the approaches to the city, their options for the final push would revolve around one of the two main choices: an attack through the city, or secure key objectives and keep expanding their control to finally achieve their main aim. The Americans have not hesitated to take on tough fights and absorb casualties, and are not likely to be deterred by the prospect of urban combat. But the issue would be to pursue the most cost-effective strategy. This would point toward the second option. The Anglo-American forces have unquestioned air superiority and a large force of combat air to support the ground operations. They could keep expanding their control over key objectives while using air power to keep hitting at possible opposition. At least ten types of Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) are being used in the war for reconnaissance and strike operations, and these could concentrate over the capital in a far more focused manner than hitherto. Given the extensive surveillance capabilities that the US has deployed in the war, it is almost certain that virtually every street would be under surveillance most of the time. Air power has not really been used historically in urban warfare in any significant way. The major examples so far have been the use of helicopters; but they remain vulnerable to small arms which would pose a major threat in the built areas of Baghdad. Use of fixed-wing fighters would naturally have a somewhat higher risk of collateral damage. But technological advances have now made it possible for the United States to use precision-guided weapons to reduce such damage. The only difference in the choice of weapons is that more of the laser-guided bombs are likely to be used in preference to the GPS-guided weapons. The world has wondered about the sudden switching-off of all lights of Baghdad on Thursday night after the city had been under heavy daily air attack since the war started a fortnight earlier but was kept fully illuminated every night. The Anglo-American forces seem to be clear that none of their strikes were targeting the power generation of the city. The explanation might lie in the possible attempt of Saddam Hussein (if he was still alive and still in Baghdad) and the key leaders of the regime to escape from the city under the cover of darkness. Northern areas may actually still provide refuge since the US forces are quite thin on the ground and many opportunities could be exploited by the old fox. This might also explain the episodic preparations for defences in the capital. Under these circumstances the collapse may come earlier than expected. Friday night might provide more clues to the curious phenomenon. But if the attempt to escape has been made and is successful, the US would be looking for Saddam Hussein in addition to Osama bin Laden in the future. The question uppermost in the minds of Anglo-American military commanders no doubt also is whether Saddam Hussein would use chemical or biological weapons in what has often been termed as the “Samson Option” where he would take a large number of people with him in a desperate suicidal attack? This would remain a possibility till the very end. Iraqi Information Minister has virtually threatened that. But the US forces are fully prepared for it and such an attack would mostly affect the Iraqis rather than the Americans. The Baath Party would stand to lose heavily for all times to come in such a case. It was one thing to gas the Kurds in 1988; but it would be different to use chemical-biological weapons against the population of the capital which holds little promise of stopping the US forces. (Air Commodore (retd) Jasjit Singh, editorial consultant to The Indian Express, will analyse the war daily. Readers can send their queries to him at jasjitsingh@expressindia.com)
