General Pervez Musharraf has once again surveyed the Pakistani landscape and arrived at some interesting conclusions. One, he feels that there is no serious external threat to the country. If India embarks on a massive arms buying spree, Pakistan will respond in kind to maintain the conventional balance. Two, he believes Pakistan could be seriously hurt by three internal weaknesses: (a) lack of political stability created by the continuing conflict over the Legal Framework Order; (b) provincial disharmony, especially over the water issue in Sindh and the bad law and order situation in Baluchistan; (c) religious extremism and violent sectarianism which is capable of destroying us.The thrust of General Musharraf’s prognosis seems correct. All these factors form part of the equation representing Pakistan’s state of being. But his ‘‘solutions’’ beg some questions. In General Musharraf’s book, India seems the only possible external threat to Pakistan. But, following 9/11 when the US threatened Pakistan with ‘‘either you’re with us or you’re against us’’, is that realistic? Is it inconceivable that the US might one day pose the biggest threat to Pakistan if Islamabad were perceived to be aiding or abetting Islamic terrorists? What if there were another big terrorist act in America in which some footprints led to Pakistan? Already, as the President has acknowledged, there are powerful voices in America asking whether ‘‘Pakistan is a friend or foe’’ for much the same reasons. For example, is Pakistan harbouring the Taliban resistance? Did it provide nuclear know-how to Korea and Iran? Is it doing enough to flush out Al Qaeda from its tribal borderlands? But leaving aside such scenarios, we must ask whether the potential threat from India should be met mainly by exploiting the newly generated fiscal and forex space in our economy to maintain the ‘‘arms balance’’.Can we afford’ this? Wasn’t our nuclear deterrent supposed to rule out precisely such a crippling arms race with India? Shouldn’t the fiscal space be used instead to generate economic growth, jobs, infrastructure, education, health and empowerment of people so that a robust economy rather than a bloated army becomes the central element of national power? Musharraf’s assessment of Pakistan’s internal fissures is also problematic. It is true that the LFO is an impediment to political stability. But the idea that stability can be bought by resolving the LFO only with the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal is wrong. The MMA is, by definition, a specific product of the peculiar external circumstances impacting on Pakistan’s border provinces in the wake of 9/11 coupled with the internal political vacuum created by Musharraf to keep the PPP and PMLN out of the reckoning. In other words, the MMA is the product of an abnormal and contrived situation. Hence it cannot be the peg on which to hang solutions for long term, institutional stability. That can only come about via a modus vivendi between the armed forces of Pakistan and its two mainstream political parties. But on that score, regrettably, Musharraf has nothing original to offer.His answer to the bad law and order situation in Baluchistan in which nearly 90% of the province’s territory is classified as ‘B’ grade no-go area is: ‘‘We’ll sort them out’’. By ‘‘them’’ he means a clutch of mischievous tribal sardars who are apparently inimical to the ‘‘national interest’’. How many times have we heard this facile description of the problems of Baluchistan and their solution? General Ayub Khan ordered the bombing of Baluchistan; Z A Bhutto sent 100,000 troops to pacify the province; and General Zia ul Haq tried to buy it off with a few ship building contracts and a sprinkling of jobs in the federal bureaucracy. But the province is as anarchic and backward as ever; and alienation from the central government runs high. Similarly, the water issue in Sindh cannot be washed away by undertaking some interactive trips to ‘‘explain the issue objectively’’ even as the representative leadership of Sindh is incarcerated or exiled for politically opportunistic reasons.Musharraf is absolutely right in his assessment of the myriad dangers to Pakistan from religious extremism. But apart from exhorting ‘‘enlightened moderation’’, he has done little to effectively tackle societal intolerance. The problem is not just one of some extremist groups in society who need to be ‘‘sorted out’’ by a combination of better intelligence and select repression. Thanks to General Zia ul Haq it pervades even now. That is why the unfortunate perception is solidifying that Musharraf is playing games whenever he announces yet another ‘‘crackdown’’ on extremist elements in Pakistan.In short, Musharraf seems acutely aware of the central problems facing Pakistan. But his well-intentioned solutions remain essentially short term survival tactics. What is needed is a longer term visionary strategy for Pakistan. (The Friday Times)
