NEW DELHI, FEB 25: The Royal Government of Bhutan (RGB), in September 1997, has ``agreed in principle to joint military operations'' against the United Liberation Front of Assam/Bodo militants, thus conceding for the first time, their presence on its soil.According to a confidential Home Ministry report on the ``issues and implications'' of the operations of ULFA and Bodo insurgents in Bhutan, the RGB, after considerable persuasion, has agreed to the joint operations but has asked the Indian Government to spell out assurances to ``safeguard Bhutan's interests during and after the joint operations.''The RGB has asked for the following guarantees from the Indian Government prior to the commencement of joint operations:* Operations once launched should not be suspended half-way for any kind of political dialogue.* It should be a ``fight to finish'' operation.* Bhutanese territory to be totally sanitised of ULFA/Bodo militants.* Full protection to safeguard Bhutanese life and property againstULFA/Bodo retaliation.* Ensure Bhutan is not subjected to economic blockade.* Adequate number of border posts be established and patrolling intensified to ensure that once the insurgents are flushed out they do not manage to return to Bhutan.* No harassment or harm should come to Bhutanese nationals in operational area as a result of the joint operation.The document states, ``The joint military operations, to succeed, would need the fullest cooperation of RGB, especially in launching surprise and simultaneous strikes at the ULFA/Bodo presence in Bhutan, including Thimphu, to prevent their dispersal into the remote areas of Bhutan.''Elaborating on the RGB's policies and perceptions, the document states that the RGB has used the presence of ULFA leaders in Thimpu to gain leverage with the Indian Government on the southern Bhutan refugee related issue. Indicators of this are: the official level RGB-ULFA contacts, permission to use Paro airfield as entry and exit point to internationaldestinations; linking the Indian Government's demand for action against the insurgents to extradition of Rongthang Kunley Dorji and demand for handing over the Deothang BRTF camps as pre-condition for agreeing to joint operations.Commenting on the ULFA's endeavours to establish contacts with the Chinese through Bhutan, the report states that ULFA `foreign secretary' Shasha Chowdhary had approached high ranking Bhutanese officers for help in transporting arms from the Bhutan-Tibet border.The report has several annexures, including details of the various ULFA camps operating in Bhutan, Bhutanese nationals and officials suspected of providing logistic assistance to the ULFA and list of Bhutanese officials who have met the ULFA leaders.On the strength and weapons of the ULFA/Bodo insurgents, the report states that at present there are an estimated 2,000 ULFA/Bodo militants in Bhutan who possess AK-47, AK-56, SLRs, LMGs, rocket launchers and land mines. It also contains details of the various ULFA/Bodocamps, their geographical location as well as the nature of their activities.