The long-awaited make-or-break report of UN inspectors to the Security Council has indicated mixed, even ambiguous, conclusions which are likely to be used differently by the US as well as those who urge restraint to buttress their respective stances. The head of IAEA, M. AlBradaei, has re-endorsed his earlier conclusions that the inspectors found no evidence that Iraq has nuclear weapons, or has restarted a weapons programme. Hans Blix, the head of UN inspection body, has reported that inspectors have “not found any weapons of mass destruction” although that, by itself, does not mean that there are no chemical and biological weapons in Iraq. Such ambiguity is likely to persist if for no other reason than the difficulties of accounting for such chemical and biological agents which have both civil and military uses, and will need time and effort to resolve. Questions have arisen over the extent to which ballistic missile ranges violate Iraq’s commitments. At the same time, even a small number of proscribed weapons unaccounted for add to the concerns that Iraq is not fulfilling its obligations. Iraq has attempted to balance the pressure with a decree to ban the import and production of weapons of mass destruction. This fulfils one of the major conditions laid down by the US, although the timing indicates its focus on countries that have adopted an approach different from that of the US and UK to urge restraint in the use of force against Iraq. The coming days are likely to witness high-pressure diplomacy, not to talk of extensive public protests in the US and European countries. There is a need to step back from the pressure of events and actions by the great powers as well as the smaller powers, each one of whom is in pursuit of its own interests. The issue at the moment is squarely with the UN Security Council which perhaps faces its biggest challenge in decades. The evidence placed on the table of the Security Council hardly justifies a UN mandate for initiating a war. In the face of the inspectors’ report the US, therefore, would be unlikely to seek a resolution authorising use of force, and is more likely to press for a condemnatory resolution which would open the way for its future policy. At the same time, Washington could derive some satisfaction from the fact that its high-pressure threat of use of force with nearly 150,000 troops already deployed for war against Iraq, has been a major factor in producing greater co-operation by Iraq to fulfil its obligations, although, seen from the US perspective, it is far from adequate. In many ways, the situation is not very different from New Delhi’s coercive diplomacy last year which produced positive results, even though not to the satisfaction of all.
