A high-powered committee has recommended the creation of a Joint Command and Analysis Centre (JCAC) under the chairmanship of an Air Marshal-level IAF officer to prevent a rogue aircraft from being used as a missile against vital installations, including Rashtrapati Bhawan, Prime Minister’s Office and nuclear installations. Ten months ago, former Director General Civil Aviation (DGCA) H.S. Khola along with senior IAF officials was mandated by the Ministry of Civil Aviation to suggest measures to deal with a 9/11-like crisis. Khola, who submitted his report last month, apparently listed several steps that could be taken to bring the rogue aircraft down. The matter assumed urgency after a Lufthansa cargo plane strayed into the no-fly zone area over 7, Race Course Road in the Capital on November 20. In view of this incident, the Civil Aviation Ministry is studying the Khola report, and has asked the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) for its comments. The Khola proposals will be implemented by the Civil Aviation Ministry after consultations with the Home Ministry and Defence Ministry. Among the Khola Committee’s recommendations: • The JCAC be set up under the chairmanship of an IAF officer with the DGCA and top officials of the Air Traffic Control (ATC) as members of the action force. • The JCAC will function under the overall guidance of the Crisis Management Group, which is headed by the Cabinet Secretary. Under the present structure, the CMG has a Central Committee headed by the DGCA and an Aerodrome Committee headed by the Airport Director. It is suggested that the JCAC be the third leg of the CMG. • While JCAC can recommend action to bring down the rogue aircraft, Air Force jets could only box the plane and escort it down. Khola has reportedly left it to the CMG to take the final decision on shooting down the aircraft. This is a different approach from that of the US Air Force, which, post-9/11, has been authorised to shoot down rogue aircraft. • Guidelines on the flight path and glide path of aircraft approaching in the vicinity of no-fly zone. • The ATC should demarcate the no-fly zone over Rashtrapati Bhawan and Prime Minister’s residence. • The commercial licence of the pilot flying the rogue aircraft or any plane violating the no-fly zone be cancelled. According to DGCA sources, the BCAS has termed the JCAC’s recommendation as infructuous. The BCAS, in its comments to Civil Aviation Ministry, has said that the Air Force and Army are already members of the Central Committee; thus there’s no point in setting up another committee. The final decision rests with the government. Further, if the JCAC is not empowered to direct Air Force jets to shoot down the aircraft, precious seconds will be lost before getting the decision cleared from the CMG. The other problem is availability of fully-loaded Air Force fighters to tackle a rogue aircraft emergency. The IAF does not have fighters in the technical area of the Delhi airport or the neighbouring Hindon airport on a permanent basis. The fighters are only brought in on the basis of threat perception. All the Air Force has is so-called ‘‘operational readiness platforms (ORP)’’ that are activated on the basis of perceived threat. It is another matter that the Air Force has the capability of getting a fully-loaded fighter into air within a minute in case the ORP is activated. This translates into the Air Force getting a fighter from Ambala airport to handle a rogue aircraft that has already entered into the no-fly zone.
