Coonoor conundrum

The Congress Party’s lack of political courage and the Left’s inability to intervene imaginatively on the foreign policy front have meant that Communist China today misses negotiating with the right-wing BJP. Neither the Congress-led government’s posturing on “Asian solidarity” nor the Left rhetoric against imperialism have much value for China, as it finds the UPA government unable to fast-track the boundary talks. The pragmatic Chinese would rather have a hardball negotiation aimed at a win-win solution that Vajpayee seemed so capable of engineering.

The aimless drift which is beginning to grip the Congress Party on domestic policy has also begun to envelop its diplomacy towards the US, Pakistan and China. On all the three fronts, the UPA government had inherited an unprecedented legacy of historic openings. The Vajpayee government had done much of the heavy lifting and had the political spunk to move beyond the sterile posturing that the previous governments had trapped themselves into with the three most important accounts of Indian foreign policy. Whether it was the innovative nuclear diplomacy towards the US, the construction of a new peace process with Pakistan, or a breakthrough in thinking in the border talks with China, it was Vajpayee who let India loose from the burdens of the past.

The UPA government is now dithering on the nuclear deal with the US, missing the big moment on Pakistan, and dropping the ball on the border talks with China. If political hand wringing is a familiar trademark of the Congress, the Left’s political stupor on Pakistan and China takes one’s breath away. The Indian communists were quick to join the bandwagon against the nuclear deal with the US and threaten the government with dire consequences. But they have had no time to exert pressure on the government to consolidate the prospects for peace with either Pakistan or China. The Left’s interest in foreign policy does not seem to stretch beyond castigating India’s ties with the US and Israel. On both Pakistan and China, the government could have benefited from a communist intervention against the entrenched establishment conservatism that is blocking meaningful action.

In terms of relative complexity, a border deal with China has been more amenable to an early solution than the prospects for resolving the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. Vajpayee made a bold departure from India’s dysfunctional negotiating position on the border dispute with China. Instead of empty posturing on high principles, legal claims and historic precedents, the BJP leadership signalled its readiness to settle the boundary dispute on a political basis. This meant practical “give and take” on the border instead of arguing that India was a victim of

Chinese aggression and Beijing had to make all the concessions.

It is this new approach that produced the first ever identification of the parameters for a settlement of the boundary dispute with China. Although it was the UPA government that signed the agreement in April 2005, the foundation was already laid in the Mishra-Dai talks. The UPA government has now faltered in the second phase of the negotiations which were to identify the mutual territorial concessions on the boundary. New Delhi has either lost its political nerve or lacks the diplomatic finesse to bring the

second round, admittedly difficult, to a successful conclusion.

It is no secret that the Chinese side is seeking major concessions in the eastern sector of the boundary, especially on the Tawang tract in Arunachal Pradesh. India, of course, is not ready to part with Tawang. As talks between Dai and Narayanan meandered, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh took up the issue directly with the visiting President Hu Jintao last November. The two leaders agreed that the negotiations must be imparted a fresh momentum and purpose.

Consequently Dai came to New Delhi within a few weeks after Hu’s departure. At the ninth round of talks, both sides had put new ideas on the table. The current difficulty in the negotiations stems less from the fact that they are far apart, but that they are focused on different elements. India’s new proposals were aimed at creating a “soft border” between Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet and restoring the historic contacts between the people across the dividing line. The Chinese emphasis, instead, was on getting a fix on the extent of territorial concessions in Arunachal Pradesh.

For all their toughness, the Chinese proposals must be seen as an opening bid on territorial redisposition, rather than an inflexible stand. The UPA government has certainly not ruled out the prospect of territorial adjustment in Arunachal Pradesh; but it is held back by fear and self-doubt to go down that road.

That the current round is taking place so soon after the ninth last January is the good news. If the UPA does not demonstrate the resolve to negotiate on territorial adjustments in this round, the bad news could well be that Beijing would choose to wait for the BJP to regain power in New Delhi.

The writer is a professor at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore