Pakistani civilians have responded in an unprecedented manner to the tragic earthquake that killed tens of thousands of their countrymen and made over 2.5 million homeless. The Pakistani government, however, remains locked in its decades old mindset of giving priority to rivalry with India and a narrow view of national security. Recent attacks by Jihadis across the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir reflect that some groups are unwilling to set aside their ideological preoccupation with violence even in times of a major humanitarian crisis.
Thousands of Pakistani civilians have mobilized to lend a helping hand in relief efforts for their 2.5 million affected compatriots. They have been digging victims out of the rubble with bare hands. Hundreds of doctors, both inside Pakistan and abroad, left their lucrative practices to volunteer medical care in makeshift hospitals. Contributions worth millions of dollars have flown from better off Pakistanis around the world. Children handed in their small savings to help their less fortunate counterparts in the earthquake affected areas. Human chains moved goods and people across mountains. NGOs, as well as individuals with divergent religious, political and ethnic set aside their differences in extending humanitarian assistance. In terms of national unity and caring for fellow citizens, this is being described as Pakistan’s finest hour.
Pakistanis have seldom failed to demonstrate national unity in the face of adversity. At the time of the nation’s caesarean birth in 1947 and again at the time of the 1965 war with India, Pakistan’s civil society rose to show its potential for unity in dealing with misfortunes. But moments of national unity brought about by shared hardship should also serve as occasions to assess a nation’s institutions.
If Pakistan’s leaders and thinkers had reflected on the strengths and weaknesses of previous moments of togetherness in Pakistan’s history, the trajectory of Pakistan’s evolution would have been different. The country could have learnt from the events of partition the pitfall of religious frenzy. The nation’s willingness in 1965 to sacrifice to defend their frontiers would not have given way to regional rivalries soon thereafter if the people had been told the truth about the war from the beginning.
Pakistan came out of 1965 war a weakened nation. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship had lost its initial strength, Kashmir was still unsettled, and inattention from the central government was upsetting the Bengalis in East Pakistan more than ever. Domestic factors were also causing unrest in Sindh and Balochistan. Brought to believe that the war had ended in a Pakistani victory, the public found it difficult to understand why “objective reality on the ground” had forced an “unfavorable” settlement on Pakistan during peace talks at Tashkent in January 1966.
The Pakistani nation, made up of ordinary soldiers and civilians, acquitted itself well in facing the challenge of 1965 as well as in the aftermath of the 2005 earthquake. But Pakistan’s government and the permanent State apparatus (which is not the same thing as the Pakistani nation) has let Pakistan down repeatedly in moments of national unity and unselfishness.
Of course, no government could have prepared for a natural disaster of this magnitude and, therefore, the government of General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz cannot be faulted for lack of preparation. But even after the October 8 earthquake official Pakistan has shown little imagination in dealing with the humanitarian crisis on its hands. Pakistan’s embassies failed to grant gratis visas to aid workers, including overseas Pakistanis, seeing the visa fees as more important than the need for relief workers. When Mr. Aziz addressed the nation on television, his tone and manner lacked any feeling. He spoke with the professionalism of a banker evaluating his client’s latest performance report, not as a leader hoping to inspire a nation.
The soldier-spokesman of Pakistan’s soldier-President, Major General Shaukat Sultan, also came across as more eager to build the image of his boss and their institution than to deal with the grim realities at hand. On October 17, Australia’s Sydney Morning Herald quoted “officials linked to Pakistan’s army” as saying that “some [army] units paid more attention to restoring the country’s front-line defences against India after last weekend’s earthquake than to rescuing trapped civilians.” The report cited a Pakistani military official as saying, “”Although the Government knew that India would not attack the country, in the first few days they used every resource to restore its defence line because they never wanted to leave it vulnerable.” General Sultan’s response, which should be taught in Public Relations Courses as an example of the kind of thing that should never be said, was, “The people are traumatised and this is all a reaction to the trauma.”
The Indian and Pakistani governments have botched up the implementation of Musharraf’s offer of opening the LOC and New Delhi cannot be absolved of responsibility for putting politics above humanitarian considerations. Debate also continues to rage over General Musharraf’s original decision to turn down India’s offer of helicopters at a time of dire need. Pakistan’s general-rulers cannot overcome their political prejudices and their desire for institutional ascendancy at a time when more than 50,000 people have died and millions rendered homeless and India’s foreign office mandarins are also unable to show imagination in working around this wall. Will they ever?
The writer is director of Boston University’s Center for International Relations and author of the book Pakistan Between Mosque and Military (Carnegie Endowment, 2005)