Cracking the code

Then why wasn’t the LTTE’s plot to kill Rajiv Gandhi foiled? The 1,600-page verdict of Justice V. Navaneetham, delivered on January 28, provides some clues. For, if the 17-volume interim report of the Jain Commission caused a spate of Government secrets to come tumbling out, the five-volume judgment lays bare at least one covert operation — of how the Indian intelligence agencies had developed the expertise to intercept LTTE’s wireless messages. And how they failed to use the expertise intime.

The judgment contains 10 pages of transcripts of messages exchanged between LTTE stations — primarily those manned by Sivarasan and Pottu Amman from March 22, 1991 (two months prior to the assassination) till June 23 (three weeks before Sivarasan consumed cyanide and died). Sample the messages intercepted before the assassination:

23.3.91 Sivarasan to Pottu Amman: “…(accomplice) will come to Madras. If it is in Delhi lot of time and lot of effort will be required.”

6.4.91 Pottu Amman to Sivarasan: “Don’t use knife on Chanrahasan (Sri Lankan migrant looking after Tamil refugees). If you don’t have pistol you make arrangements.”

7.5.91 Sivarasan to Pottu Amman: “Here V.P. Singh is coming. We are receiving. Like that we are receiving all the leaders (talking about their `dry runs’)… We are moving with her (Nalini, the cover for human-bomb, Dhanu). Girls (Dhanu and Shubha) are telling that the intention can be revealed to her. She can be believed.”

Justice Navaneetham relied heavilyupon the wireless intercepts to establish the nexus between the conspirators in the run-up to the assassination and their attempts to flee Tamil Nadu afterwards. Among the 80 coded witnesses (whose names have not been disclosed till date) presented by the prosecution were four wireless experts working with the Indian and Sri Lankan intelligence who authenticated the LTTE’s wireless communications.

One such coded witness, working in the Sri Lankan National Intelligence Bureau, said he was intercepting LTTE’s messages since 1985. A day after Rajiv Gandhi was killed, he picked up early-morning conversations between two LTTE operators named Pandithar and Andrew. Pandithar read out a news item from a newspaper about Rajiv Gandhi’s killing in Sriperumbudur. On hearing this, Andrew laughed loudly.

While giving evidence before Justice Navaneetham, the Sri Lankan wireless expert said this exchange reminded him of a similar conversation he had intercepted on March 2, 1991. On that day, Pandithar and Andrew hadspoken about the assassination of former Sri Lankan Minister, Ranjan Wijerathne and had also laughed sarcastically.

Another crucial message was intercepted by the Sri Lankan intelligence from station No 14, manned by LTTE supremo, V. Prabhakaran with LTTE’s base camp, coded as Papa Alpha, a day after the assassination. In this message, Prabhakaran asks if `Kilo’ (Kittu, a top-ranking LTTE leader) had made an announcement that the group was in no way responsible for Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination. The same day, a message from Prabhakaran’s wireless set had gone out to all LTTE stations that the Rajiv Gandhi killing should not be discussed between themselves.

Besides such evidence, the Sri Lankan experts provided a chart showing LTTE’s communication network and the hierarchy of the LTTE’s military and intelligence wing. While Pottu Amman is shown in it as the chief of the Intelligence Wing, Akila is stated to be the deputy leader of the LTTE’s women intelligence wing.

On behalf of the Indian intelligence,two coded witnesses deposed in the special court in Poonamallee but curiously, they are first identified in the judgment as employees of the Union Home Ministry and then the “Special” Intelligence Bureau. One of them said he had been intercepting messages transmitted from LTTE stations since 1988, but had begun to monitor station numbers 91, 95 and 910 (all in the name of Pottu Amman) only from early 1991. After the messages were recorded on a cassette player they were decoded by a Tamil working in the Department of Cryptology.

However, the evidence marshalled by the SIT showed that while the LTTE commanders first spoke about the assassination as early as March 1991, no warning could be provided to the Government since the messages had not been decoded by then.

According to sources in the SIT, the interceptors could crack the secret codes only four days after the assassination. Once having cracked them, they continued to listen in and provided transcripts of messages exchanged between Sivarasan andPottu Amman on a day-to-day basis to the SIT, eventually leading up to their detection and capture.

A passing reference to this is made by Justice Navaneetham who points out that the defence counsel had argued the wireless intercepts were not sound evidence since they had been decoded after the assassination. To this, the judge said the wireless experts had given “acceptable” and “convincing” answers. They had said that decoding secret codes was a laborious process and that they needed to study the frequency patterns on several messages before cracking the code.

“That is why,” the judgment notes, “in this case only after getting sufficient number of messages could he make an in depth study of the frequency pattern and applying the method of “substitution” was able to break the codes. Once the codes were available, here is what was picked on LTTE stations after the assassination:

22.5.91 Pottu Amman to Sivarasan: “Don’t send long messages. It will create suspicion…Even to our people in higherplaces we informed that we have no connection with this.”

25.5.91: "Is the photo of Anbu (Dhanu) identifiable? Press cuttings of all the newspapers are needed… For Thatya (Subha), as you have a strong foothold. I will later inform you about that task.

7.6.91: "Regarding Chanrahasan, if it misses with knife finish him with with pistol. If there is no facility to give pistol make arrangement and come" (The messages indicate that Sivarasan’s squad was expected to execute more killings)

11.6.91: (Sivarasan to Pottu Amman): "Persons known to us were caught. Hectic search on for others. Due to separation from Anbu (Dhanu), Thatya (Subha) is not active. Effort by me in vain. No response unless given encouraging news." 12.6.91 Sivarasan to Pottu Amman: "CBI has released the photos of Thatya and officer girl (Nalini, whose father was a police inspector). Hence, I am keeping Thatya with me ready with weapons without leaving her alone in any house…The name of Indu Master (Murugan) has also come out…Thebrother of officer girl, her brother were arrested.

12.6.91 Pottu Amman to Sivarasan: "Many of your supporters who helped you may not have been arrested. They may mount surveillance on them. Be careful. Be ready to go like that."

16.6.91 Sivarasan to Pottu Amman: "It (a meeting of police officers) was held in Madras. The name of the CBI officer is Karthikeyan, who is next to Vijaykaran."19.6.91 Sivarasan to Pottu Amman: "Foreigners (neighbours of safe-houses where they were hiding) are suspecting. There is a news about award of 10 lakh for information about me. 5 lakh for information about Thatya."

20.6.1991 Sivarasan to Pottu Amman: "In case of emergency my weapons will take action on the enemies. The place where others have been taken by CBI is known and I have taken position…. The soul of sister Anbu will rest in peace. The morale of the CBI will come down."

21.6.91 Pottu Amman to Sivarasan: "Whether all of you have cyanide capsules. Did Indu Master have cyanide capsule? Does he know the messagegiven by us?"

23.6.91: "In Indian news it is learnt that a special police force was formed to arrest both of you. Be careful. They are trying to capture you alive, using tear gas, other gases they may try to thwart your attempt to consume cyanide unexpectedly… but yesterday a engine fitted vessel sank in the sea. Due to bad weather. So, don’t expect the vehicle immediately"

This is probably the last message wireless contact made by the LTTE to the one-eyed Jack. After running from one hideout to another, Sivarasan, Subha and five other LTTE leaders took shelter in a hide-out in Konankunte, in the outskirts of Bangalore.

At 7 p.m. in the evening on August 19, 1991, they panicked and fired at the policemen who surrounded the house. Realising they were close to their big game, commandos of the National Security Guard were called.

Sufficient quantities of anti-dote for cyanide was at hand when the police stormed the hide-out the next morning. The inmates were all dead.