Dialogue dilemmas

How is the latest stance of the Hurriyat Conference — threatening to withdraw from the peace dialogue with New Delhi — to be decod...

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How is the latest stance of the Hurriyat Conference — threatening to withdraw from the peace dialogue with New Delhi — to be decoded? That it is a genuine expression of its concern over the fact that human rights violations are continuing unabated, despite the Centre’s assurances? That it is being forced to respond to hardline pressure, both from within the Conference and without? That it is an attempt at achieving some unity in an organisation that is seriously threatened by fissiparous tendencies and leadership struggles? That unpredictability has come to be perceived as a useful weapon by the Hurriyat leadership to “tame” New Delhi and make it more amenable to their demands?

Possibly all the factors listed here have played their role in freezing the Hurriyat into its current position. It cannot, for instance, be denied that the security forces need to get their act together on the human rights front, especially at the lowest levels of its operations. It cannot also be denied that the hardliners under the Syed Ali Shah Geelani leadership, who had broken away from the Mohammad Abbas Ansari faction and claimed to represent the true Hurriyat Conference, continue to have a presence in the Valley. They maintain that a peace dialogue with New Delhi without the participation of Pakistan is a meaningless exercise — an argument that could carry conviction in certain pockets. It cannot be denied that the Hurriyat Conference has not been the most stable of organisations. The recent no-holds-barred battle for the control of the People’s Conference, an important constituent of the Hurriyat Conference, between the legatees of Abdul Ghani Lone — sons Sajjad and Bilal — is more evidence of that. A posture defying New Delhi could then prove to be a unifying move. As for the last argument, it is well recognised that suspense is a useful political tool for the weaker player to get on a more even footing with the stronger.

There are, therefore, several pragmatic reasons for the Hurriyat’s threat to pull out. We would, however, argue that such a move would be counter-productive, not just for the nation, but for the Hurriyat Conference itself; not just for future peace, but present influence. The very fact that the Hurriyat has been able to project the human rights agenda in the Valley, the very fact that Home Minister L.K. Advani, no less, has officially instructed the security forces to conform to human rights norms at every level of their operations, indicates a new power which the Hurriyat Conference could well fritter away by being unnecessarily negative. Indeed, the peace talks are a chance for the Hurriyat Conference to emerge as the chief guardian of regional aspirations — but this is possible only if it is conscious of the opportunities it now has.