There are some signals that America is looking for an exit strategy in Iraq to be implemented as the presidential election in November 2004 approaches. Ambassador Robert Blackwell, currently working as the deputy national security advisor to the president, has visited Baghdad. The visit has not been publicised but his mission was to make an on-the-spot assessment of the ground situation, the effectiveness of the US-appointed Governing Council, the performance of Administrator Bremer, but above all to figure out an exit strategy before the election.The other significant signal is that the administration is talking more and more of “Iraqification”, a term that inevitably recalls to the public mind “Vietnamisation”, which led to a humiliating retreat from Vietnam with a loss of over 58,000 American lives. “When the United States announces a schedule for training and deploying Iraqi security officers, then announces the acceleration of that schedule, then accelerates it again, it sends a signal of desperation, not certitude,” the Republican Senator and Vietnam veteran Senator John McCain told a Washington think tank recently.The administration has compelling reasons to fast forward “Iraqification”. The morale of the troops is low and getting lower. The soldiers who have returned have no good word to say about the Pentagon’s management of the situation in Iraq. Even Jessica Lynch, who was celebrated as a heroine by a Pentagon-instructed media, has turned against her president for exploiting her story. Advertisements have appeared targeting Bush, “He lied and my son died.” The number of Americans disapproving of Bush’s handling of Iraq has gone up to 52 per cent.What should worry the US administration even more is the much publicised finding of the Congressional Budget Office that it will be impossible to sustain the current force levels beyond next spring without imposing longer tours of duty on troops already demoralised. Whether America does a “cut and run”, as the American media have started to talk about, or not, a drastic reduction in force levels is definitely being planned. General Peter Pace, vice-chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has announced that the level would be brought down to 100,000 by next spring and 50,000 by 2005.That the desperate situation has adversely impacted on the US administration’s judgement is clear. Any one who knows Iraq’s history should have known that having Turkish troops in that country will be like mixing water and fire. Turkey, that in February this year disallowed the use of Turkish territory for sending US troops that came by sea and waited at the Turkish ports for weeks, finally agreed to send troops to Iraq despite strong popular disapproval. But Washington, which had expected concurrence from its own handpicked Iraqi Governing Council, was in for a nasty surprise: the Council vetoed the entry of Turkish troops into Iraq and Turkey announced promptly that its troops would go only upon an invitation from that Council. In Washington, Deputy Secretary of Defence Wolfowitz has started blaming Secretary of State Colin Powell for the mess. One or two senators have asked the president to change his secretary of defence, Donald Rumsfeld. The direction of the Iraq policy has been taken away from him and given to Condoleeza Rice already. It should not come as a total surprise if Rumsfeld were to dropped in the near future.The moot question is: will “Iraqification” succeed in creating the conditions for an honorable exit? Observers are doubtful. If Americans start recruiting Iraqis right and left, how do they make sure that some hardened Baathists do not get in? While the Iraqi police might guard oil installations, will they go out, look for fellow Iraqis, and kill or arrest and bring them to the Americans for interrogation?A more fundamental a question is: is it in the interest of the Iraqis that the American enterprise in Iraq and for the region succeed? On a recent visit to Dubai, I did not come across a single Arab who did not want the enterprise to fail. I personally believe that it is in the interest of all concerned that it should fail. In fact, it can be argued that Bush should not be faulted for failing to occupy Iraq peacefully, as a little reflection will show that no conceivable strategy would have worked. His fault is attempting the impossible.
