Don’t make mistake that Pak did in Kargil

For some years, I have been warning that this proxy war can easily escalate into a conventional war, notwithstanding the nuclear deterrence. There can be situations where both the ‘initiator’ of the proxy war and the ‘affected’ nation are tempted to use conventional weapons and forces, the former to achieve its ends, and the latter to bring the proxy war into the open.

Pakistan, since its very inception, has built considerable expertise in using militants or irregulars on their own, or as an extension of Pakistan Army for war. It first did it in J-K in 1947-48, and then in 1965 when, in Operation Gibraltar, it infiltrated irregulars into Rajouri- Poonch Sector. On both occasions, this strategy led to a conventional war. This was followed by two significant developments: first, its participation in a Jehad in Afghanistan, and second, its acquisition of nuclear capability in the ’80s. This encouraged Pak military to conclude that since a conventional war with India was not possible, the proxy war should be encouraged.

In 1999, Pakistan made use of the armed conflict in J-K to launch the Kargil war. This time, regular Army personnel shed their uniform and dressed as irregulars to fight in the Indian territory. Taking advantage of the terrain, and extreme climatic conditions, the Pak Army achieved a tactical surprise but could not cope up with the subsequent Indian politico-military reaction. The outbreak of Kargil war also showed that Pak political and military leaderships were out of sync; there was no link between their political and military objectives.

Now we hear a great deal about military options. Although these cannot be ruled out, it would be prudent to remember the lessons from Kargil war. India must not make the same mistakes that Pakistan military did in its Kargil venture. The political aim must be clear and militarily possible.

That brings me to the N-factor. It is strange that instead of putting sufficient pressure on Pakistan to stop trans-border terrorism that may lead to military retaliation by India, the US is attempting to dissuade India by parroting the ‘nuclear flashpoint’ argument. It has now been ‘revealed’ that during Kargil war, Pakistan had prepared, or was preparing, its nuclear arsenal for deployment. This is neither convincing nor substantiated.

During the Kargil war, India faced the formidable challenge of driving away Pak intruders. Despite that, the Indian political leadership decided to act with restraint, and the military accepted the difficult mandate of not crossing the LoC. One of the reasons was to keep the nuclear threshold far away. The Federal Minister of Pakistan for Religious Affairs did speak about the possible use of nuclear weapons, but no one supported him. Pakistan Army and its leadership fully understand the implications of using nuclear weapons. Therefore, instead of repeatedly harping on the N-flashpoint argument, the US should make Pakistan understand the inherent dangers of continuing proxy war with India.