Double talk on CTBT

A new ambiguity is appearing in official references to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Until a few weeks ago the line was, the government is working towards a signature on the document. Now the old mantras are back with the Prime Minister saying India will not subscribe to discriminatory regimes and the Defence Minister suggesting recognition of India as a nuclear weapons power and disarmament measures linked to the CTBT are essential preconditions. It is not right that the country should have to piece together disconnected statements from cabinet ministers to figure out where the government stands on the CTBT. And it is disturbing to learn five months after Pokharan-II that there is no consensus or clarity on key security and foreign policy issues. There cannot be a consensus when Opposition parties are left completely in the dark about the government’s plans and intentions. It is particularly striking that I. K. Gujral should complain about this. The former prime minister has been going round theworld drumming up support for India’s nuclear tests and yet, he says, the government has made no effort from the start to take the nation into confidence. George Fernandes’ assertion that there will be no signature on the CTBT without Parliament’s approval is all very well. But there can be no hope of depoliticising the CTBT issue or winning Parliament’s support for any agreement reached with Washington if the government withholds information and speaks in riddles. The Prime Minister should lead a domestic consensus, not count on it coming about miraculously.

The Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott talks are going through a rough passage. That much was obvious after the fourth round. Does the current double talk reflect that or something more? In what was believed to be a last-minute addition to his speech at the UN General Assembly, Vajpayee indicated he would like to see Washington ratify the CTBT prior to India signing it. Government officials have since reiterated the point. It is an odd argument to make atthis stage. Could it be that, as once before in the early stages of the Geneva negotiations, the betting is on diehards among the P-5, this time in the US Congress, scuttling the CTBT?

Fernandes’ latest remarks also raise the suspicion that the government is providing itself with escape hatches. Having moved away from language linking the CTBT to specific steps on disarmament from the P-5, why go back to it now? Why insist on formal recognition of India as a nuclear weapons state when Vajpayee had already precluded that as a precondition for signing the CTBT? The new ambiguity could be a reaction to what Fernandes reveals is Washington’s lack of response on dual-use technology transfers. Or is the government having second thoughts about the CTBT for other reasons? Contradictory language on the CTBT confuses the country. Reverting to 1996-style rhetoric will make it more difficult to prove the test-ban is worth joining when the time comes for it. A prepared official statement is necessary to clear the air.Allowing confusion to grow and speculation to flourish sows trouble for the future.