In the end, it whittled down to two concerns: the absence of a political consensus and the ground situation in Iraq which continues to be volatile. Tempted to sit at the global high table by sending combat troops to Northern Iraq, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) today finally decided India’s interest lay in moving to Iraq only under a UN umbrella. At the CCS meeting, Deputy Prime Minister L K Advani, External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha, Defence Minister George Fernandes and National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra made it known they were against sending troops without the UN cover. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee had been wary from day one, aware that such an exercise was not without the possibility of Indian troops firing on Iraqis. Finance Minister Jaswant Singh, it’s learnt, was the only one who favoured sending troops to Iraq with or without the UN mandate. With the political fall-out of sending troops weighing heavily on the mind, the CCS had to consider two options: Whether troops should be sent if the newly formed Iraqi governing council invites India?; whether troops should be sent only under the UN mandate? It’s learnt that the CCS did ‘‘tangentially’’ discuss the first option but eventually said a no. The second was found to be the only feasible option as it would not have a domestic political fall-out. What swung the decision, however, was the ground analysis which clearly indicated that deployment of troops would involve confronting resistance groups and require use of force. The analysis, relied upon for placing a note before the CCS, spoke of leaflets being circulated in Iraq to target and attack even supporters of the US-led coalition forces. The ground situation report categorically stated that Indian troops would be required to use force either in self-defence or in counter-action ‘‘Such kind of action would result in casualties on both sides and may slip into counter-insurgency type of operations. This will certainly create ill-will and hatred against the stabilisation force among a large section of population,’’ the report stated. The volatile situation on ground would have left Indian troops with no other option but to adopt an ‘‘aggressive and proactive’’ approach. The ground assessment was against Indian troops using a ‘‘soft’’ approach as this would have been exploited by resistance groups. One factor which may have been considered by the Government was the fact that Arabs, mainly Sunni Muslims, make the largest group in the Kirkuk-Mosul area. A large number of these Arabs were part of Saddam Hussein’s army and were said to have been influenced by the resistance movement in Tikrit and Baghdad. The assessment was that these Arabs would have a negative mindset about Indian troops. Indian concerns also stemmed from the diplomatic ramifications with Iraq’s neighbours, especially Turkey. The report indicated that Ankara was party to Kirkuk’s internal politics.
