Flying apart without political will

exercise. After all, the proposal to merge the two airlines into a powerful one has been in the air since the day they were born way back in 1953. That it never took place was more due to providential grace and less to any raw wisdom of the ruling babus.

There is no denying that AI is in a shambles with everything about it being seemingly irretrievable. By comparison IA is much better off having virtually got out ofthe spin, thanks to some bold decisions taken by the incumbent management. Their problems are so widely, though often boringly, discussed that a rerun of the same is quite purposeless. What is readily conceded is the need for a revival plan. The question is whether a merger of the two airlines provides the right recipe.

The success story of the British Airways seems to be the referral point. This, to be sure, is unexceptionable, but only if what is sought to be replicated is not merely the form but the content as well. Herein lies the hitch.

British Airways was born out of the merger of two abysmally ailing airlines, BOAC and British European Airways. The fact that the two had predominantly overlapping operations made merger a logical step. Additionally they had an identical fleet composition in view of their matching network.

No such advantage exists in our two airlines. Except on the Gulf and neighbouring routes, the two airlines do not have overlapping operations. And their fleet composition andrequirements are different. Consequently, the two airlines have for long been operating in vastly different marketing situations demanding equally different responses. This has had its impact on their managerial styles.

The British success was wholly due to the political backing given to the revival plan broadly carried out in three stages. The first stage was the setting up of an expert committee headed by Sir Michael Edwards to study and prepare a comprehensive revival plan. What came of the exercise was one of the most brilliant baleout blueprints which, in the event, became a referral point to many similar turnaround plans elsewhere in the world. The second stage was its implementation under the joint leadership of Lord King and Marshal in an ambience of total managerial autonomy which saw the emergence of British Airways as the world’s most favourite airline. The third and final stage was the airline’s privatisation.

Can a similar exercise be ever conceived and implemented here? This is the issue. Towhat unconscionable bullying the managements of the two airlines are subjected to day in and day out is known to all. CEOs come and go to the pleasures of the reigning deities of the ministry. To expect managerial miracles in an ambience of absolute acquiescence is pipedream.

Creation of a common board and a common balance sheet that is being hawked around as the starting point of the turnaround strategy hardly promises anything. In fact the common board concept had been tried earlier but did not click partly because it did’nt have any powers but largely because those who constituted it were strangers to the complex business of air transportation. Nothing suggests that the new board will be any different.The success stories of British Airways, Singapore Airlines and Qantas and the vastly improved profile of Air France underline one harsh truth: resurrection is possible only if there is a political will backed by a good management team with powers to pursue a clearcut strategy untrammelled by anyconsideration other than commercial and economic and a determination to ruthlessly implement it. Fortunately, the latter is available if the track record of the incumbent CEOs of the two airlines is any guide. There is nothing to suggest that the former too exists. On that, any plan is bound to stall.