Flying to nowhere

Conceivably, one more vault at the Union Civil Aviation Ministry will be readied for the safe custody of the fresh findings of the expert team.

Be that as it may, there is one difference, and a crucial one at that, between the two exercises. By Kelkar’s own admission, IA had left the worst behind by the time his scrutiny had begun. The experts therefore confined themselves to fine-tuning the policies already initiated by the management, besides telling the government where it had gone wrong and why and how it should atone for its past mistakes.

For AI, it is a different story with everything about it being in a terrible shambles. Its finances are appalling, its fleet is archaic and its operations only add up to its losses with just two sectors — Gulf and Russia — raking in measly profit. The only field in which it beats its competitors is in respect of staff, the ratio being 750 employees per aircraft against the industry norm of 150 per aircraft.

In many ways, AI’s plight is reminiscent of its British counterpart — BOAC — of the sixties. The latter, however, has come a long way to become arguably the world’s favourite airline. But its resurrection was possible only because of a series of bold decision.

Can such a turnaround possible in AI’s case? Theoretically , yes, but practically doubtful. A serious attempt calls for a far more comprehensive and incisive inquiry into the affairs of Air India than what the Kelkar Committee has been ordered to do. No less importantly, the findings must be implemented without fear or favour.

Air India’s biggest handicap has been its management style, the exceptions being during the stewardship of B. P. Patel in the fifties and K. G. Appuswamy in the mid-eighties. But it did not really affect its fortunes in the first half of its over six decade existence because the industry itself was a large cartel with IATA deciding everything with charters and bucket-shops making occasional forays of no serious consequence. AI’s managerial mores merged well with this.

The scene changed dramatically with the opening up of the skies and the collapse of IATA and its regulatory mechanisms in the mid-eighties. Most of the airlines the world over took the cue and changed their styles of operation to great effect. Not AI, which continued, and still continues,with its languorous ways unmindful of the market truism that in airline business, as in politics, past success provides no bankable resource to draw on in hard times.

Even this would have been less damaging, if the managerial camaraderie built up over the years had been kept up.Tragically, the mid-eighties saw the emergence of management by intrigue rather than by objective. In the event, the mandarins of the ministry made merry. But when the chips were down, they sought scapegoats among the airline’s managers. Their continuing callousness is seen in the unconscionable delay in regularising the appointment of the present CEO even as the airline is struggling to remain airborne.

For all that one knows, Kelkar and his expert team will do an honest work and deliver a package to save the airline from the spin it finds itself in. But that’s only half the job. The other half is what really matters, of going in for some hard options, including a conscious decision by the government to keep off, at least for some time.