Frontline Najaf

The negotiated peace between the US forces and the firebrand Shia leader, Muqtada Sadr, in place in the Shia holy city of Najaf in Iraq had generally held since the fighting of April-May last year, with sporadic and minor incidents of violence. But a sudden shift in US strategy saw the army replaced with marines with armed patrols intruding into the city all the way to Sadr’s home. A major offensive was apparently ordered by the Interim Government of Iyad Allawi with Iraqi and US forces with a siege of the city ten days ago. And that started a spiral of violence with the American forces using massive firepower — including tanks, helicopter gunships and jets fighters — against the lightly-armed militia called the Mehdi Army of Muqtada Sadr, leaving nearly 400 Iraqis dead in two days of fighting.

The US-Iraqi government offensive in Najaf breaking the ceasefire in place since May has probably been triggered by a few factors. They were apparently losing control over cities adopting what has come to be known as the “Fallujah Model” following US failure to militarily control the Sunni resistance town west of Baghdad months ago in spite of using massive firepower. It had handed over control of the town to local forces; and city after city has been refusing to allow US presence in the streets and establishing their own local government to a degree that Iyad Allawi had begun to be referred to as the mayor of Baghdad. The Najaf offensive possibly sought to stem that slide into what’s been termed as the new sovereign “city-states” pattern and stop it from spreading to Shia cities. Najaf was also seen as the best chance for the US and the Baghdad regime for quick success against Sadr’s militia which has little battle experience.

The goal, as stated by Iraqi officials and American commanders, has been to take over complete control of the city. In ordering the offensive the Interim Iraqi Government has probably tried to exclude Sadr from the conference of 1,000 influential Iraqis scheduled in few days to select the 100-strong council that is to oversee the elections in January 2005. But it is difficult to escape the suspicion that the Bush administration has been motivated also by the need to show some dramatic results by annihilating the Sadr forces before the November presidential elections. The Mehdi Army would no doubt be defeated by the combined strength of American and Iraqi forces. But the gamble could backfire if the US does not win quickly, or if the already injured Muqtada is killed, and/or the holy shrine of Imam Ali is damaged. In each of those cases, Iraq’s tragedy would only intensify. It is important for the international community to intervene to broker peace before it is too late.