Grit with conciliation

India has disturbed the existingstrategic equations and macro-level political plans of the superpowers. We have posed an operational challenge to unilateral restrictions on technology transfer to developing countries. We have profoundly changed the Asian security environment, overtly confirming our capacities in relation to the other major Asian entities, Russia, China and Japan and, to some extent, Pakistan.

More importantly, we have disrupted the nuclear powers’ long-term agenda of remaining dominant in the international order, conceived at the end of the Second World War and remained an over-arching aim even after the Cold War.

International reaction to India’s abandoning ambiguity for categorical and demonstrated affirmation of its strategic capacities has been negative, as expected. But it is the nuances that India should note. The US and Japanese governments have been most concrete in their criticism and have imposed sanctions. Despite President Clinton’s posture of pain, the fact is that his administration is extremely irritatedwith the Indian government and will impose sanctions to the maximum extent feasible. The language of Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth’s testimony to Congress on India’s tests clearly indicates the deep resentment of US authorities.

This resentment will, however, be marginally tempered by the views of House of Representatives Speaker Newt Gingrich, influential political figures like Kissinger and Brzezinski, and experts like Haas. American public opinion is divided. We must work to utilise the rational elements in the US establishment and public opinion to keep relations on track and not become jingoistic or confrontationist. Japan shares the concerns of the industrial countries. But it is also prompted by the apprehension higher levels of militarisation in an Asian country generates about Japan’s own right-wing politicians and military establishment who want to change its commitment to pacifism and non-proliferation. Japan is the only country to have suffered a nuclear attack. We must react withunderstanding.

Britain, Germany and France — especially France — did not support extensive sanctions. Russia has argued against sanctions. India can take preliminary satisfaction that, though critical, Western Europe and Russia want to continue cooperation. Our policies should be responsive.

Neither the UN Security Council nor the Non-aligned Foreign Ministers’ Conference at Cartagena have condemned India despite efforts by some countries. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan statement of May 19 is significant: “You cannot have an exclusive club whose members have nuclear weapons and are refusing to disband it and tell others now not to have it. The nuclear powers need to rethink and set an example for other nations.” Though there is no endorsement of India’s action, it has certainly changed the status quo terms of reference on disarmament and arms control. There is a slowly emerging view on looking at these issues in terms of India’s logic of many years. We should encourage this process. Amongst ourimmediate neighbours, Sri Lanka has supported the tests. Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Maldives have expressed no definite opinion. Pakistan has objected strongly and decided to come out of the nuclear closet. China is equally critical, partly due to India’s argument that its nuclear weaponisation was primarily a response to the Chinese threat. At a deeper level, it is natural for China to view with reservation a qualitative change in Asia’s strategic balance. Its unquestioned dominance stands slightly challenged, but only slightly. We must keep the dialogue with Pakistan going without unnecessary belligerence and assure it of no-first use. With China it is absolutely necessary to bring relations back on track. Escalating the current confrontation which, frankly, has been begun by us, will be detrimental to our mutual interest as well as regional stability.

I have noticed in my interactions with Asian, African and South American diplomats, whatever their governments’ formal stance, an undercurrent ofsatisfaction that a developing country has overcome discriminatory pressures and asserted its self-reliance and technological achievements.

We should not deal with the tests as an end in themselves but proceed to make the capacity we have attained deployable both in terms of weaponisation and delivery systems. There is no need to be paranoid or defensive. We must immediately initiate bilateral discussions with nuclear and other major world powers to apprise them of the rationale of what we are doing to assure them that we shall, as before, remain a restrained and responsible country.

I wish we had not been so specific in mentioning China as the reason for our nuclear weaponisation, in George Fernandes’s statements and in the first communications sent by Atalji to his counterparts. It would have been sufficient to emphasise the deteriorating regional security environment. We have landed in an unnecessarily confrontationist stand with China. This is not appeasement or defensiveness but advocacy of what isreasonable.

Our economic and technological policies should be predicated on our facing sanctions and other pressures for perhaps two to five years. If we sustain the momentum of the security postures initiated at Pokharan this month and demonstrate grit in the face of sanctions, it is reasonable to expect that the world will come to terms with us.