Ground-level inputs arrive: what troops, if they go, need to be wary of

• Delay in establishment of interim authority has led to disillusionment among Iraqi people who now suspect the occupying authority’s capability to bring back normalcy. Signs of increasing frustration even among those who suffered at the hands of the Saddam regime and this may lead to more organized attacks against the coalition forces and their supporters.

• Situation in Mosul-Kirkuk highly sensitive and tense, series of armed clashes between the Arabs and Kurds, the latter being of Indo-European stock. These developments are significant, as the US wants India to send a division-level force (between 12,000-15,000 troops) to ‘‘stabilize’’ the area from North of Tikrit to Iraq’s border in the north.

• In Mosul-Kirkuk, regular incidents of attack on coalition forces and attempted looting of UN warehouses.

• No evidence on who is behind these attacks but prime suspects: former Iraqi soldiers who have lost their jobs and livelihood; former Baath party members, Islamic fundamentalist groups opposed to coalition forces as well as criminal elements.

• While Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Kurdish Patriotic Union (KUP) leadership are for Indian troops in Northern Iraq, the situation may get complicated once coalition troops pull out due to political ambitions of the Kurdish leadership and the mistrust between the two main parties.

• The other complicating factor is the presence of Turkish-Kurd Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) extremists in pockets close to Turkish and Iran borders. Any assertion from the PKK would have serious security ramifications in Turkey, which already has a brigade level force near Dohuk to carry out counter-PKK operations.

The inputs received in Delhi suggest that Indian troops will have to adopt an aggressive and proactive approach to stabilize the region, as well as maintain close liaison with neighbouring Turkey and the Kurdish parties.

However, given the current state of relations between US and Syria, Turkey and Iran, it appears that the regional countries are interested in a stabilisation force instead of US/UK coalition troops.

The attitude of regional countries towards Indian troop deployment also has sent mixed signals to New Delhi. Kuwait is supportive of New Delhi’s moves but Jordan and Turkey like to see Indian troops with a defined and clear-cut mandate. Saudi Arabia and Iran would like to see troops under the UN mandate. Syria has a long-standing opposition to any outside intervention in Iraq. Such mixed sensitivities of the neighbours indicate that India will have to factor regional security and economic ramifications if troops are involved in peace-enforcement mode. This is not to forget the repercussions on the minority audience back home if such a move is taken.

Factoring the trend of attacks on coalition forces, the broad feeling in South Block is that the Indian force should be prepared to handle a counter-insurgency role. This also means that the force will have to independent in operational and logistic requirements including medical support.

Simply put, this translates into substantial financial resources, which is currently being put at Rs 1300 crore a year, as well as maintaining uninterrupted supply lines from across the borders.