
Thirty four years ago, on December 16, Dhaka was liberated and the surrender by the Pakistani military symbolised the victorious culmination of the nine month long 1971 Liberation War that saw the birth of Bangladesh. Commemorated as Victory Day in Bangladesh, this day is also the first Vijay Diwas (Kargil followed in 1999) for the Indian fauj. A recall of the events that preceded this emphatic military victory offers insights into the strategic culture of the Indian higher security establishment and the extrapolations that may be valid for the near future.
At a fundamental level one may aver that the break-up of the composite state of Pakistan which comprised its dominant western part and the poor relative, East Pakistan, was inevitable. Geography and the prevailing political environment made the viability of a state separated by thousands of miles and deep ethno-cultural differences among its people very brittle. While this diversity may have been accommodated in a democratic polity, the Pakistan military dominated by its Punjabi and Pashtun factions were determined to oppress and deny their Bengali brethren their electoral due. The net result was the emergence of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman as the rallying point of a nascent Bangladeshi political identity that supplanted the religious affinity and from late 1970 onwards, the Pakistani military began a campaign of repression and mass killing of its East Pakistani citizens. Ten million and more refugees took shelter in India which had to deal with this humanitarian challenge all alone — for the international community was supportive of West Pakistan’s regime for subterranean geo-political reasons.
The new state had hardly consolidated before it was racked by internal dissonances that began with an active fifth column furtively supported by the Pakistani intelligence. Very soon, Mujibur was assassinated and the fledgling Bangladesh military seized power. An anti-India sentiment was deliberately stoked and gradually the country was Islamised. In the decades that followed, political instability grew and the roots of a secular democratic dispensation weakened. Widespread impoverishment and declining socio-economic indicators pushed Bangladesh down the index of developing countries. What was evident, post-Cold war, was the frustration of a new state trying to seek its identity along negative determinants.
Shrill majoritarianism replaced the more tolerant ethos associated with Bengal and, ironically, religion which was rejected as the cohesive entity for nationalism in the 1947-1971 period, acquired an almost malignant primacy. Consequently, today the country is being held hostage by a small constituency of religious right wing radicals who have succeeded in intimidating the ruling BNP regime. There is considerable anxiety that it is becoming a safe haven for religious extremism. The worst case scenario is that Bangladesh may become the next Afghanistan under Taliban rule.
December 16 has different resonances for India. Clearly this was an emphatic military victory and perhaps the pace was on occasion unexpected — for instance, the fall of Dhaka. Tribute must be paid to the leadership of Indira Gandhi and the top brass of the Indian military — the Manekshaw, Pratap Lal, Charles Nanda combine. Yet, in retrospect, one may infer that India’s politico-military synergy proved to be inadequate. The overwhelming victory that saw Pakistan permanently dismembered and the capture of 93,000 prisoners of war did not result in astute war termination objectives that could have enhanced India’s abiding national interests. Territorial consolidation based on long term Indian security imperatives was not pursued and while the 1972 Simla pact was magnanimous in intent, it did not reflect any political-military perspicacity.
Granted that nation-building is an onerous task and even the most powerful and affluent nation, the US, has found it daunting. India, barely 25 years old in 1971, did not have the resources or the politico-military strategic acumen to embark upon a Marshall Plan and rebuild both Pakistan and Bangladesh. The international mood was also inimical to Delhi. But 34 years later what merits deep introspection is the manner in which the trajectory of Bangladesh — whose birth India midwifed — has become a serious regional security concern. The demographic influx and the cynical manipulation of such ingress for electoral advantage is now part of the political history of the Indian Northeast. The net result has been a deterioration of the internal security situation in the Indian states adjoining Bangladesh and current indicators suggest that this problem has become hydra-headed with tentacles that have taken deep root in the Indian polity and spawned varied interest groups that thwart any meaningful redressal.
India’s primary security challenge now is the internal dimension and the manner in which proximate neighbors can exacerbate the situation. The Indian security establishment which includes the political apex, the military, the paramilitary and the local police needs to acquire greater political-military acumen and in many ways, Bangladesh has become a litmus test. It merits recall that addressing the Combined Commanders in October this year, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh observed: “I do believe that it is in our national security interest to ensure that our neighbours evolve as viable states with moderate and stable political and social environment and a robust economy.”
If they do not, then the Indian security forces would be fighting a two-front war of a different kind. This was not what was envisioned 34 years ago when Dhaka was liberated and Vijay Diwas ushered. Evolving a long term regional security strategy that synergises all sinews in the national quiver is more urgent than is currently perceived.
The writer is deputy director, IDSA, New Delhi. The views expressed are personal


