Last month, with time on his hands before ticket allotment, Digvijay Singh untied the blindfold he wrapped around the eyes of Sri Sri 108 Namdevji Das Tyagi five months ago to aid Sri Sri 108’s quest for a good monsoon in MP. Once again it was impossible to escape the term that has dogged Digvijay —soft hindutva. It is a term he has scoffed at: ‘‘There is no such thing as soft hindutva. This is a creation of the media. I do not excessively propagate my deep religious commitments. We must understand that people in the country have deep faith in religion. Mahatma Gandhi used religion to unite people during the freedom struggle. Will you call it soft hindutva?” Soft hindutva describes a response dictated by the BJP, similarly linking up Hindu symbols to political ends but stopping short of advocating Hindu nationalism. And on this count, Digvijay is guilty. His proposal to allow Hindus the right to worship at the Bhojshala/Kamal Maula masjid every Tuesday, the demand for a national Bill on cow slaughter, the move to make the cow the state animal, all took place in a specific political context. They did not stem from ‘‘his deep religious commitments’’. A defense of Digvijay’s deeds is usually made on the two grounds. Consider the manner in which Mark Tully, answering criticism of his BBC documentary, refers to Digvijay, ‘‘.there are indications that within the Congress itself, rethinking about its interpretation of secularism is going on. In the documentary, the chief minister of Madhya Pradesh, Digvijay Singh, while not in any way embracing hindutva or accepting my criticism that the Congress has been ‘against religion’, did say the party’s commitment to a mul-tireligious India ‘sometimes got blurred’’’. Tully’s description actually indicts soft hindutva as practiced by Digvijay. When the Congress, as in MP, also subscribes to the use of symbols from one community, or leans towards a policy favouring one religious community, the party is halfway down the road the BJP wants it to take. This is best illustrated by examining the secular position in the Indian context. Octavio Paz, who well understood the often tragic nature of the interaction between Islam and Hinduism, refers to the ‘‘two secular institutions created by the British but composed of Indians: the army and the civil service’’. It is an extraordinary statement by a perceptive observer. The Indian army would hardly be in tune with the western secular ideal. It consists of regiments based on caste and religion; it employs granthis, maulvis and poojaris. But the army chief does not subscribe to any religion in his professional capacity, neither does the army as institution. The difference between an Indian army and Hindu army is obvious. This is the difference the BJP wants to bridge when it talks of a Hindu nation rather than of India. Nehru allowed religious freedom to exist even in the public space, but the BJP wants to make this public space a Hindu space, or defined by Hinduism as the BJP understands it. The attempt to make a bogey out of Nehru is an effort to cover up the real parameters of the debate. In this context, a second defense of soft hindutva is offered. This argument goes that the army chief does not have to get elected by an electorate that is mainly Hindu. The need to cater to this majority forces Congressmen such as Digvijay to don the garb of soft hindutva. But there is no evidence for this view. This strategy didn’t help Kamal Nath in Gujarat; in MP it can only be a conclusion stemming from armchair analysis in Delhi, overlooking how this campaign has actually progressed. Uma Bharti took charge of the campaign in December 2002. In the same vein as Gujarat, the sangh tried to stir trouble over the Bhojshala and the VHP spearheaded looting in Ganj Basoda over reports of cow slaughter. But the BJP found no public response to these issues. Well before the Bhojshala sellout was announced, the BJP failed to muster any support outside the district of Dhar. By April this year, it was obvious that the power crisis was the issue for the voter. It was then that the BJP followed suit. Events in MP are only recapitulating the factors responsible for the rise of the BJP in the country. It is easy to blame Nehru or his idea of secularism, but at least 25 years separate Nehru’s death and the rise of the BJP. These include years of misadministration by Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. The Indian electorate examined every alternative from the left — the disasters range from V.P. Singh to Deve Gowda and Gujral — before backing the BJP. The BJP is in power today not because of hindutva but because every alternative made a mess of governance. This is being repeated today in MP. Unfortunately for Digvijay, while soft hindutva can be conjured up, there is no such thing as ‘soft development’. Perhaps, it is appropriate that his main hope for the polls ahead has nothing to do with soft hindutva — Sri Sri 108’s blindfold is unlikely to help — but goes by the name of Mayawati.
