India should talk rivers with China

The proposed diversion of Tsangpo would adversely affect the flow pattern of the river downstream. As China would control the flow to suit its hydropower generation and irrigation demands, India would be at its mercy for releases during dry and flood seasons. The diversion would also upset Indian river linking project, in which Brahmaputra has a decisive role. Further, the use of nuclear explosives for tunnelling through the Himalaya could trigger major earthquakes in the region.

Though Beijing had been secretive about the scheme, frequent media reports did expose the Chinese plans. For example, in February 1982, the Executive Intelligence Review Special Report quoted studies carried out on the feasibility of damming the Tsangpo at the Great Bend where the river takes a sharp U-turn before entering India. The proposed diversion through tunnels would enable 240 to 330 billion units of power generation annually.

Another report in the Scientific American (June, 1996) brought out Chinese engineers assuring the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics in December 1995 that Tsangpo waters could be diverted to the Gobi desert blasting a 20 km channel through the Himalayas using nuclear explosives. A news item in July 2000, described flash floods in the river devastating many areas in Arunachal Pradesh. The flow pattern indicated a dam failure in Tibet and, though China denied it, satellite imagery confirmed this.

After many such reports in 2003, China’s official news agency, Xinhua, finally confirmed plans for the Tsangpo Water Diversion Project on the basis of preliminary studies carried out in mid-2003, followed by feasibility studies in October. The project to be located at Perma Koe site at the Great Bend would have two components: one, a power plant with an installed capacity of 40,000 MW to use the river’s potential falling through 3000 m in a length of 200 km; two, the diversion of Tsangpo waters by pumping across the Tibet Plateau to the North West provinces. The construction of the project is scheduled to start in 2009.

No one would doubt the Chinese capacity to implement such projects. One example is the gigantic Water Diversion project that annually transfers 1.8 billion cubic metres of water through a 85.3 km long tunnel in the mountainous Northeastern China to the Dehuofang reservoir across the Hun River. The project is scheduled to be completed in 2008.

In 2003, India had expressed to China its concern over the issue. But, unfortunately, China continues with the view that there would not be any problem of reduced flows or water quality in the river, considering the terrain and limited culturable area and the population in Tibet. However, unless China is brought under a treaty on the use of the Tibetan rivers, we are bound to suffer. Interestingly, some time ago the Chinese Committee on Irrigation and Drainage was keen to enter in an MoU with the Indian National Committee for exchanging information. But India let the opportunity slip through sheer inaction.

At present there are no agreements between India and China on transboundary rivers except for an MoU for sharing hydrological information on these rivers.

There is a glimmer of hope now with China showing renewed interest in activating the joint mechanism set up in 2006 to address the long-pending issues. It is up to India to seize the opportunity.

The writer is ex-member-secretary, Indian National Committee on Irrigation and Drainage menon_ms@rediffmail.com