India’s nuclear summer

On July 21 when the principal negotiators accepted the final version of the agreement, they accomplished a task that continues to bewilder several countries around the globe. Indian diplomats will relate the surprise with which their foreign counterparts ask how India managed to get this good a deal.

That surprise stems from the fact that no deal in recent history has questioned one of the pillars of the current international order — the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nor has India negotiatied a pact where a key tenet of the international order has had to be altered in its favour. This is what sets the N-deal and the just concluded 123 agreement apart.

Also, the negotiations generated unprecedented public debate across the intellectual and political spectrum. Added to this was the sheer complexity of the agreement because of its technical nature. This made for devils creeping into the detail and led others to see such devils where, many a time, none existed.

If the July 18 joint statement reflected political will to move in a certain direction, the March 2 Separation Plan was a major step, domestically, for India gained US recognition of its weapons programme. The Hyde Act, however, spotlighted India’s flexibility to accept US domestic compulsions and showed the immense power the non-proliferation lobby still wields in Washington.

On the 123 agreement, strangely, the onus was on India to get it right, — the stakes were larger for New Delhi and so would be the implications.

It was clear from the start that the US, which had a fixed template of the 123 agreement, was looking to leave the contentious issues open-ended to allow the balance of power to play itself out at a later date. India, on the other hand, was aware that the Hyde Act gave a one-time waiver and that this agreement would have to stand the test of time. It was keen that no question remained uncovered by the agreement. This tussle over detail saw many hiccups, at points even hardening positions on either side, thereby threatening the N-deal.

The most exasperating moment for India was the June visit of the American pointsman for the N-deal, Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns. Washington had clearly hoped to seal the agreement then, offering to consider India’s requirement to reprocess spent fuel at a later date when the need so arises. The US was willing to discuss a separate agreement for reprocessing in the future.

Burns told Manmohan Singh that the US had come “as far as it could” on the agreement but “gaps” still remained. Singh let it be known that he had reached an understanding with the US president and it was for Burns to bridge the gaps. India had made it clear that this was a “two-way process”, indicating that it could even walk out of the deal if the US refused to show flexibility.

It was during this visit that National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan first offered a dedicated and safeguarded national facility to store foreign-origin spent fuel. Contrary to popular perception, the idea actually came from the Department of Atomic Energy that sought to break the impasse. A DAE representative confirmed that this could be done as a measure of confidence.

Despite this, the agreement hung in the balance until the pull-aside meeting between Singh and Bush in Germany, where the US president expressed surprise when told about the issues blocking the deal. He asked NSA Stephen Hadley to sort out the differences internally after talks with Narayanan.

In many ways, Bush’s intervention delivered the agreement. Interestingly, many feel it could all have been deliberately set up by Burns and company for the US president to magnanimously bridge the final gap. A more accurate understanding would be that there is institutional resistance from the US bureaucracy, trained as it is not to deviate from the NPT and the order that flows from it. The US has gained tremendously from the order, and to make an exception for India is a decision many in Washington still find hard to accept.

The reason, perhaps, can be found in the new power order rather than in the non-proliferation system. In the shaping of perceptions, Bush took a call two years ago that in the post-9/11 world, India was uniquely positioned as stable democracy, vibrant economy and plural culture to hold credibility on the world stage. More importantly, 9/11 brought this part of Asia back in focus and Bush was convinced of India’s potential to be a force for stability in this volatile region.

For India, the consequences are diverse. While it will immensely benefit from opening up the atomic energy sector, the fact is that India through this agreement has taken the first step out of nuclear isolation. India will have to adjust to the global non-proliferation order as much as the current order will have to accommodate India. Technology controls, a proactive approach to check proliferation and a strengthening of safeguard regimes will be issues on which India will have to take a stand.

How New Delhi responds to this new challenge and opportunity, with fresh ideas and the ability to translate them into a consensus for action, will to a large extent determine India’s credentials as a global power. In other words, India can no longer get by as a rebel in the non-proliferation order.