Iraqi army not ready to take over in Fallujah

It's been two years since US forces cleared out this dangerous western city, the bloodiest urban combat of the Iraq war.

It’s been two years since US forces cleared out this dangerous western city, the bloodiest urban combat of the Iraq war. But Iraqi soldiers still aren’t ready to stop Fallujah from becoming an insurgent stronghold again.

US teams say training efforts have been undermined by corruption, a dearth of basic equipment and Iraqi soldiers’ mistrust of those from different Muslim backgrounds and lack of faith in the government.

Iraqi commanders acknowledge they can’t handle a city as large and volatile as Fallujah without American support—especially with the country teetering on the edge of civil war between the Shiite majority and Sunni minority. “It’s something we keep in mind, that one day coalition forces are going to leave. But it can’t be now,” said 1st Lt. Hamazah Adman, head of intelligence for the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division. “We can say that two years may be enough,” he said.

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There are more than 400 adviser teams in Iraq, and Gen. John Abizaid, head of the forces in the Middle East, said he recommends expanding those teams as the US looks for a new direction in the war.

Not waiting for Washington, Marine Col. Lawrence D. Nicholson, commander of Regimental Combat Team 5 in Anbar province, began moving troops from combat to adviser teams in January. That increased the size of the training teams in the area from 10 to between 15 and 20 Marines.

Fallujah, a Sunni city of 300,000, lay in ruins after fighting in November 2004. Now the lights and water are back on and many residents who fled have returned. The Iraqi army now patrols more than 60 percent of the city, helping to battle insurgents who have killed scores of Marines with roadside bombs, ambushes and sniper fire.

The Americans complain that much of their time is spent ensuring Iraqi soldiers are paid and that they receive basic equipment like flashlights and gloves. Higher-ups pocket supplies meant for troops, and many soldiers sell uniforms and boots while on leave, returning to demand new ones.

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“Most of the time we can’t advise. We are too busy running around protecting ourselves or just making sure the army has the basics,” said Sgt. Thomas J. Ciccarelli.

The Iraqis don’t have enough soldiers to patrol Fallujah. Officially, the 2nd Brigade is more than 700 men short, but the real number is probably far higher because of desertions and “ghost” soldiers who exist only on paper. Ciccarelli’s transition team is supposed to be advising 465 soldiers, but actually interacts with about 300.

Lt. Col. James Teeples, a senior adviser to US military training teams in Fallujah, said many problems stem from corruption at the Iraqi Defense Ministry. While the average soldier makes less than $700 monthly, officials pay bribes of $15,000 to become brigade commanders, anxious to pocket kickbacks from the lower ranks.

He said many Iraqi soldiers try to do their jobs honestly, but supplement their incomes by stealing supplies like ammunition and selling them on the street.