
THE Kargil crisis was quite different from what we are experiencing today. The politico-military aims of Operation Vijay were clear cut: vacate the Kargil intrusion. Since containing the Kargil conflict was an important corollary aim of Operation Vijay, the Indian Navy had successfully seized the initiative on the maritime front and prevented any spillover of the conflict at sea. With coalition forces milling around in the North Arabian Sea, the maritime scene today is quite complicated. Barring the similarity of heightened tension, the overall situation we are facing today has really no likeness to what happened during the Kargil crisis. It
The present face-off with Pakistan is almost in its sixth month, having started with the provocative attack on our Parliament in December last year. With India’s diplomatic offensive in full swing, the demands of coercive diplomacy have to be continually finetuned and translated into clear cut operational directives to enable our military commanders in the field, to deploy their forces to their best advantage and abide by the rules of engagement — more so now as we transit through a phase of rising tension.
Was the efficacy of coercive diplomacy successfully demonstrated during the Kargil crisis? One such example was the swift and decisive deployment of the Indian Navy’s combined fleets. By all account it ‘‘startled’’ the adversary and in a manner of speaking, ensured compellence on the maritime front.
Today’s developing situation has evoked concerns about the risk of a possible nuclear flare-up between India and Pakistan. Let us face it, we are now fairly and squarely a nuclear weapon power with an assured capability at hand. With confidence we must continue to induce stability into our nuclear equation with potential adversaries. Acquiring additional room for manoeuvre on the conventional front is what is required to handle the problem of cross-border terrorism.
Having said that, I do believe that we need to guard against being swept away on a surging wave of war-hysteria that appears to be gathering momentum. War ought to remain the final option when all else has failed. At a moment like this, one tends to look back at Kargil. Notwithstanding the diplomatic and military success of Operation Vijay, there were lessons to be learnt, which have been well documented in the Kargil Committee Report. In its wake followed the Group of Ministers (GoM) recommendations on Defence Reforms — a far sighted initiative designed to enhance the operational efficiency of our armed forces. Now as we prepare to face yet another war-like situation three years down the line from Kargil, one is confident that our armed forces are in sound shape and well prepared. They would need to be. The strategic situation of today is far more complex than before. Kargil was a different story.


