Lines and boundaries

In the eastern sector, the Chinese made it clear that they would not recognise the McMahon Line, but suggested that they might be amenable to a similar boundary with some adjustments. This position stemmed from the domestic constraints on the Chinese government. Having forcefully staked a claim to the entire sector, Beijing found it difficult to retract completely. China appears to have sought an affirmation of its claims in Ladakh, and was ready to forgo those in the east except in some places like Longju, Khinzemane and others. These were ‘grey’ areas along the McMahon Line in that they lay north of the line as marked in the original maps of 1914, but were actually south of the highest watershed. The Indian position was that the line was intended to run along the watershed, and despite discrepancies the boundary had to be interpreted as such. In short, the package deal of 1960 did not imply that China wanted no concessions in the eastern sector.

Deng Xiaoping revived Zhou’s ideas in 1980, suggesting that the problem could be resolved if both parties “respect the present state of the border”. This formulation papered over the differences on the eastern sector, especially in the grey areas. The Indian response reflected the perceptual gap. The then minister of external affairs, P.V. Narasimha Rao, stated that China was making no concession by giving up claims in the eastern sector as they had never possessed that area. Yet he welcomed the prospect of this sector being settled “without any particular difficulty”. Thus when talks commenced in 1981, the Indians refused to countenance a package solution and called for a Chinese withdrawal in Ladakh. Delhi’s impression that China might be prepared to entirely forsake its claims in the east also led to a proposal for a sector-by-sector approach. The rationale was that once China agreed to the Indian-claimed boundary in Arunachal Pradesh, it would be politically easier for Delhi to make concessions in the west. Moreover, selling such a deal in the political marketplace required that the Chinese at least give up the 3000 square miles of territory in Ladakh annexed in 1962.

China assented to a sector-wise approach demanded by India. But they began to press their claims over Arunachal Pradesh, particularly Tawang, which had had strong ties with Tibet. Beijing now called for a package deal involving Indian concessions in the east and Chinese concessions in the west: a reversal of their earlier stance. This reflected two considerations. First, it made for good negotiating tactics. Now that concessions in one sector were no longer coupled with gains in another, it made sense to adopt a maximalist position in each. Second, domestic constraints continued to necessitate some adjustments in their favour in the eastern sector.

The discussions in the following years focused on clarification of the Line of Actual Control, again at India’s insistence. While it may have been useful in precluding clashes along the border, it contributed nothing to the resolution of the dispute. It is reasonable to conclude that when the current round of negotiations began, the minimum requirements of both sides remained unaltered. Delhi wanted a Chinese withdrawal by about 3000 square miles in Ladakh; Beijing needed some concessions in the grey areas in the eastern sector. The political parameters and guiding principles drawn up in April 2005 aimed to facilitate the reconciliation of these interests. Both sides agreed to strive for a package settlement involving all sectors. Further, the settlement would be along well-defined geographical features. It is worth underlining that Beijing has insisted since 1960 that a watershed is not the only such feature. Finally, the agreement would protect the interests of settled populations.

This last point was tantamount to an acknowledgement by China that its claims over most of Arunachal Pradesh were notional. Yet from Beijing’s perspective, they are a useful bargaining counter until a satisfactory settlement — including some adjustment in the eastern sector — is reached. The Chinese ambassador’s comments need to be viewed in this perspective. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has reportedly clarified to President Hu that uprooting settled populations is unacceptable to India. This does not mean that India can make no concessions whatsoever in the eastern sector. These compromises obviously need to take into account India’s security concerns. Alongside a Chinese relinquishment of some territory in Ladakh, they could pave the way for an overall settlement. Such an outcome calls for patience and tact. It will have to satisfy multiple constituencies in both countries, not least domestic opinion and the military. Hyperbolic responses to well-known positions can hardly aid this endeavour.

The writer, whose core research area is the Sino-Indian border dispute, teaches at King’s College, London