Marching disorders

Second, Hurriyat cadres who went into the high commission must have been aware of this surveillance. Why were they, then, so indiscreet to go in and carry the money out? The lady from the Hurriyat, instead of being taken into custody soon after leaving the high commission, was arrested a kilometre or two away. If she was to be caught red-handed, why not near the high commission? Our police authorities say she mentioned money being given to her by Jilani. But according to newspapers, she did not mention Jilani by name in her statement in court. The case gets more curious when one takes note of the fact that a senior Delhi Police official stated at a press conference that the lady, Anjum Zamrooda, was to take the money and deliver it to some contact in Bangkok. If the money was to be used from Bangkok, could not the Pakistan embassy in Bangkok disburse the money instead?

Another worrisome aspect is that the entire exercise was controlled by the Home Ministry and police authorities. There was no, or little, consultation with the Ministry of External Affairs, or perhaps even the PMO. Reliable sources claim that the MEA came to know of the incident and follow-up action from a television report. The first statements about the incident and follow-up action being considered were made by a joint commissioner of police, and so on. The question arises, is the Home Ministry becoming the principal determiner of India’s foreign policy agenda?

The implications of this recent development in our bilateral relations are:

• India has signalled that it will take decisive action on Pakistani diplomatic links with separatist elements in Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of India, regardless of the status and rank of the officials involved.

• An equally clear message has gone out to the Hurriyat and other such groups that they would now be subject to more drastic remedial action on their networking with Pakistani authorities.

• India-Pakistan relations have deteriorated further, which will make the resumption of bilateral dialogue more difficult.

• Major powers, particularly the US, would interpret the incident as India’s unwillingness to restore some normalcy in Indo-Pak relations.

• Musharraf will utilise the incident to increase hostile and subversive activities in India and launch a diplomatic offensive against India. It will help him to assuage extremist elements in Pakistan critical of his siding with the US in its anti-terrorist campaign.

• While Pakistan remains isolated to some extent as a state harbouring terrorists, its credibility as an ally of the US remains undiminished. The US will generate pressure on Musharraf’s behalf on India to resume dialogue.

• As always, the large Muslim population in India will be concerned about heightened levels of Indo-Pak hostility.

• With the US planning military operations against Iraq, high levels of Indo-Pak tension will be considered by the US and its allies as a factor disturbing their anti-terrorism and anti-Saddam campaign. This would be so in the context of the Government of India having reservations about America’s impending military plans against Iraq.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, some serious thought should be given to additional options in the linear logic of Jilani’s expulsion. The government should consider freezing bank accounts and other financial assets of the Hurriyat and other separatist groups operating in India, particularly those linked to the ISI. India should consider declaring Pakistan a terrorist state taking the legal implications into account, a step we have not taken so far. We have limited ourselves to advocating to other countries that Pakistan be declared a terrorist state; consideration could be given to closing down diplomatic missions of Pakistan in India and India in Pakistan, for a brief period. Interested sections of both countries could continue to function in friendly embassies in each other’s capitals to maintain minimum levels of contact.

India’s Pakistan policies should have two macro-level ingredients. First, to respond decisively in terms of retaliatory action against any major terrorist violence organised by Pakistan in India. Second, we must think about commencing a dialogue at some appropriate official level with Pakistan in some third country by the autumn or winter of this year.

There is one more serious, and to some extent introspective, question which must be considered. Is the Government of India’s present orientation in its Pakistan policies only a foreign policy move, or are the most recent decisions motivated by considerations of domestic politics and the general elections which are just a year away.