A few days ago when the war clouds started gathering, the cabinet secretary wanted to activate the Union War Book, the master switch based on which all concerned take action. The secretary of the UWB was known as the Joint Secretary (Military). The appointment was carefully called JS (Mil) because of the importance these two magic letters have in the Indian system to open most doors of power. He kept the key to the Indian war machine and operated it on the orders of the Cabinet Secretary. Who else could order every state and Union Territory to carry out their respective duties as given in the Union War Book except the Cabinet Secretary? The military wing, till 1991, was the third wing of the Cabinet Secretariat, the other two being civil and intelligence wings. It was conceived as the link between the politico-bureaucratic apparatus and the armed forces. It has now disintegrated into oblivion in the wake of the so-called integration of the armed forces with the Ministry of Defence (MoD). In their place, we have now the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), which is yet to take off for various reasons. The IDS has not gone beyond being the fourth headquarters outside the MoD, shorn of all powers and even staff. As a result, the first civil servant of the country has been deprived of independent military support. In other words, there has been no substitute for JS (Mil). Much before Independence, Lord Ismay, with his experience of having advised the reorganisation of the defence at the national level in the US, was ordered by Lord Mountbatten to structure a higher defence organisation to suit our conditions after Independence. He came up with the idea of various committees for higher defence control with a common secretariat under the military wing to support the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC), all inter-service committees and the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC). Through this arrangement, Lord Ismay ensured no wires got crossed and information flowed smoothly through the entire Indian war-making machine. MoD mandarins never liked the Military Wing as it allowed the services interaction with the decision-makers. The first change in the suggestion of Lord Ismay in 1948 was that the service chiefs could not go direct to the prime minister and the next was the shifting of the Military Wing from the Cabinet Secretariat to the MoD in 1991. However, because of the secretary to the UWB being JS (Mil), a service officer in rotation, the services had a say in the provisions of the UWB and, by implication, in the fighting of war. But this vital link has now gone missing. It is clear that many do not know what is a War Book, leave alone UWB. A report filed on May 21 by a national daily called it ‘‘a confidential document containing records of previous wars’’. Lord Ismay would have been amused to see how we have now totally dismantled the system. Originally, Lord Ismay conceived JS (Mil) as a brigadier. The post was later upgraded to the rank of major general. As the ninth army officer to hold this post since Independence, I know it should only be held in rotation as envisaged originally and the top man should be privy to the decisions of all interservice committees. Integration of the armed forces has never been without controversies in most countries. There are some arguments against it like losing a bit of the single service operational cohesiveness in utilisation of resources. However, the gains of combined synergy far outweigh such disadvantages. Let us not yet set in cement all the changes and be prepared for a review based on experience under our peculiar conditions. Problems in India are encountered more in practice, despite the best rules and organisational structures. What we need to develop is a culture of greater direct access for the services to change the perception that ‘‘Gods and soldiers are remembered in the time of trouble and never before; when the troubles are righted the Gods are forgotten and the soldiers are slighted.’’ "The writer is a retired lieutenant general
