Since 1992 the defence budgets after adjustment for inflation have remained almost static. It is now about 2.2 per cent of the GNP as opposed to the 3 per cent that was deemed ideal. In the last few years, barring the acquisition of the Su-30 fighter aircraft from Russia, force modernisation has been neglected. Even after the induction of the Su-30, the Air Force consists mostly of aging aircraft. The condition of the Navy is just as bad.
It has only one aircraft-carrier left. The submarine fleet is mostly obsolete. The surface fleet is no better. At the present rate of attrition and replacement, it is estimated that the Navy will be half its size in the next decade and a half.
The state of the Army, which is the nation’s main fighting arm, is shockingly bad. It has not undergone any significant modernisation since the late 70’s. Its infantry is still mainly equipped with the Ishapore 7.62-mm SLR rifle. The 1983 plan to replace the basic infantry weapon with the modern 5.56-mm automatic rifle is yet to be implemented. A few units have recently been issued these weapons. The mainstay of the armoured forces are still the Vijayanta and Russian T-72 tanks. Both these are of 1960’s design.
The indigenous Arjun main battle tank (MBT) is yet to be productionised even though it was first unveiled in the 1985 Republic Day parade. Because of the controversy concerning it, the Bofors 155-mm howitzer programme has not been fully implemented. No indigenous manufacture has been undertaken with the result that the artillery is still deficient in this vital area. The deficiencies in arms have substantially affected our defence capabilities.
One can even say that the situation vis-a-vis China is about the same as it was in 1962. We are only about well-placed with regard to Pakistan.
The deficiencies in arms have had their effect on tactics. We have seen little innovation and our battle plans have hardly changed since the 50’s.
The paradox of the failure to modernise has been that we need a manpower intensive military. Newer weapons and mechanised forces greatly increase firepower and offensive potential. If we fail to modernise or continue to do it at the current pace then we run the risk of having our manpower advantage neutralised by an enemy with better weapons. An objective analysis will reveal that, both in 1965 and 1971, we came barely ahead in the fighting in the western front. Things are not significantly different today. The most obvious consequence of this is that Pakistan does not have a major disincentive not to resort to the use of force. We have seen a lot of evidence of their willingness to fight a proxy war in J&K and to fire across the LOC without pause.
Equally deplorable are the service conditions in the armed forces. The food that the jawans receive is of abysmal quality. This is so even in field areas. The quality of accommodation provided is poor. There is no privacy and little recreation. It’s surprising then that few jawans volunteer to serve longer than required. The relative situation vis-a-vis JCOs and commissioned officers is just as bad. An officer usually serves for about two years in a post. By the time he is allotted quarters, it is almost a year. By the time the family has been with him for a year it is time to move on. Most officers, when they get housing, have to make do with that meant for officers a rank or two below them. The services are short of housing by about 30 per cent. Educational facilities for children are also fast declining. Consequently, general morale is at an all-time low.
Rising discontent — recently we saw unrest boil over in the IAF — is proof of this. It also speaks volumes for the calibre of the leadership. There are deep divisions that have set in within the hierarchy. It is no secret that the IAF and Navy have witnessed serious in-fighting in recent years. The present Navy chief came to hold his office after waging a battle in the courts. In the Army, the infighting is better concealed. Promotions or denial of promotions often tend to be arbitrary. This has encouraged a culture of sycophancy. Professionalism is often sacrificed as a result.
The three services remain largely aloof from each other. In an age of air-land and air-sea warfare, most major powers have combined service commands. For instance, in the USA it is the Joint Chiefs of Staff under a chairman who could be from any service. But the concept of joint-planning is almost totally absent in India. Each service is mainly geared to fight its own war. If the Army and Air Force came under one command structure, it will result in the better utilisation of resources. For instance, if the Navy and Air Force pooled their resources together, the Navy’s requirement of air power could be met by the IAF, and it may not require another aircraft carrier. Similarly, the Army may not require so many attack helicopters.
The divided service chiefs are subordinate to the defence ministry where even minor bureaucrats have the authority to overrule the requests of a service chief. Recently, adeputy secretary in the ministry put up a sign outside his office indicating that only officers of the rank of colonel and above were allowed into his office! The result of this is that the armed forces are not in the policy-making loop. This is a critical deficiency. In 1962, the order to evict the Chinese from the Thagla Ridge against military advice was given by the then minister of state, K. Raguramiah, and conveyed to the Army by H.C. Sarin, then a joint secretary in the ministry. In 1971, when the demand for action against Pakistan reached a crescendo, it was only the forceful personality of the then Chief of Army Staff General Manekshaw, that prevented hasty and unproductive action.
Clearly, just increasing the defence budget is not the solution. We need to rethink our military structures, and re-organise the defence ministry to give the armed forces a greater role. With a regular combined staff headed by a chairman to whom all the chiefs will report, the administration of the ministry can be integrated into this structure. Similarly, the various independent regional commands of the three services can be rationalised into combined military commands headed by a single officer.
The nation’s defence requirements, both in terms of equipment and organisational restructuring needs to be re-evaluated, bearing in mind the rapidly changing security environment and new technologies that are resulting in a new generation of high-performance conventional weapons. A detailed review by an expert committee must be undertakenimmediately.
The writer is a management consultantct a¬Ut›P+¼Tt›rowth rate of 8 per cent for the year 1998-99,” says an analysis by Kamal Sen of DSP Merrill Lynch.Industry pundits and exporters are not sure about many things. Will interest rates be a short-term phenomenon? Will the rupee continue to depreciate against dollar? If so, will the RBI tighten the measures again? The Indonesian rupiah has plunged nearly 80 per cent, Malaysian ringitt by 42 per cent, the Thai baht by 48 and Korean won by 46 per cent. As summed up by Bombay Stock Exchange president M G Damani: “India and China are now being seen as wise countries, which did not succumb to the pressure or temptations to open their economies beyond their absorbing capacities.” For how long, it is to be seen.