Moment of the army

During the coffee break, she summoned me to her private lounge. She explained the political circumstances prevailing in the early 1990s and the continued pressure on her from the Pakistan army. I told her that she had missed an opportunity to clarify and gain public support in India. But I could not help admiring the sincerity with which she was reaching out.

In March 2007, she came to address the India Today Conclave. She declared her commitment to democracy in Pakistan and improvement of Indo-Pak relations, with greater passion this time. When questioned about her secret parleys and deal with Musharraf, she did not deny these. She said that their future depended upon Musharraf giving up the appointment of the Pakistan army chief. When I said that as Pakistan PM she would have to keep the army in the barracks and not just Musharraf, her reply was, “The question that you have put to me is a very important one. My party has been studying what has been done in India and other countries. We called for parliamentary scrutiny of our military’s budget. We also intend to look at certain reforms so that the military and security apparatus come under the Parliament. I used to think winning an election means democracy is restored. But I have learnt painfully that that it is not so… I know that it is going to take substantive reforms to bring that about and I hope that the new generation of officers in our armed forces will be looking at the 21st century in a new light and will appreciate that it is economic emancipation and economic growth that brings the real dividends.”

Bhutto’s assassination on December 27 was well planned. The firing on her from close range followed by the blasting of her car by a suicide bomber ensured that their target could not escape and no one would get close to her immediately after the incident. In the terrorists’ determination and tactical sophistication, this act was a step ahead from the usual suicide bombing. The deterioration of the security situation in the North West Frontier Province and Balochistan, desertions and poor performance of the security forces in Swat and other areas, the Lal Masjid episode, regular bomb blasts, and now the assassination of Pakistan’s tallest political leader shows that the overall security situation in Pakistan is in disarray.

The political situation in Pakistan has been delicate ever since Musharraf dismissed the country’s Supreme Court chief justice, Iftikhar Chowdhury, last year in March. That dismissal caused widespread street protests and eventually turned into a campaign for civilian-led democracy. Without political and civil support, the Pakistan army’s ability to handle Islamic militancy within its own borders stands seriously impaired.

Pakistan is faced with two major crises: Islamic militancy and waning confidence of civil society in Pervez Musharraf’s government. The long-term solution for both would be genuine democracy and socio-economic development. In the short run, however, both these problems are closely linked to the Pakistan army and its ability to enable the national polity and society to function.

The problem for Pakistan’s army is compounded now because it also faces a crisis of credibility, morale and confidence; the third worst after Indo-Pakistan 1971 and Kargil wars.

Benazir Bhutto realised that (as did her father in 1972). Pakistan’s civil society may be against the army’s political and administrative interference and demand constitutional changes and refinement of higher defence control organisation, but no one would want to see harm done to this national institution; not even Pakistan’s respected human rights activist, Asma Jehangir, who broke down after Bhutto’s assassination and said some harsh things about the army’s role.

Ask any analyst of the political or strategic situation in Pakistan — other than George Bush — and he will tell you that the person responsible for creating this messy political situation and hurting the image of Pakistan army is the one who commanded it for the last nine years. A few weeks ago, General Musharraf retired from the army and handed over the baton and command to his chosen friend and subordinate, General Ashfaq Kiyani. It is the latter who has to shoulder the responsibility of making the army credible and operationally effective and obtain support from the people of Pakistan.

Ashfaq Kiyani is known to be a serious, professionally sound officer. His first statement on counter terrorism calling for the use of minimum force in the FATA and the realisation that it was primarily a political problem was impressive. There was a whiff of fresh air and suggestion of change from past practices.

How will Ashfaq Kiyani react to the emerging political situation in Pakistan? Can he come out of Musharraf’s yoke and shadow to restore public confidence in the army and within the army? A possibility that cannot be ruled out is that with the support of some Corps Commanders and political leaders, he may persuade/force Pervez Musharraf to resign and thus stop being a burden on the army and cause further chaos in the country. Such a step will enable him (and the Pakistan army) to start with a clean slate. Is he capable of doing that? Let us wait and watch.

The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff. Currently, he is president, ORF Institute of Security Studies, New Delhi