N-deal: Now, focus on IAEA safeguards

El Baradei, who received the Nobel Peace Prize this year, strongly defended the US nuclear deal with India in a conclave of non-proliferation hawks in Washington last month. Under the nuclear pact signed by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the US will resume atomic energy cooperation with India, once India identifies its civilian military facilities and puts them under IAEA safeguards.

Saran had a useful exchange of views in Washington on India’s nuclear separation plan and the language of the nuclear legislation that the Bush Administration. These discussions, which reportedly went way beyond Indian expectations, would be continued at the next round in Delhi in January.

Further clarifications from both sides should help finalise the separation plan and the legislative language. That would allow the Bush Administration to approach both the US Congress, which reconvenes in the third week of January, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group to change the nuclear rules in favour of India.

It is learnt that Saran also discussed the nature of IAEA safeguards on India’s civilian facilities. While the safeguards agreements would have to be negotiated directly between Delhi and the IAEA, American support would be crucial.

India’s nuclear separation plans are inextricably linked to the type of IAEA safeguards to be put in place. A unique safeguards arrangement with Delhi, that fully recognises the reality of a military nuclear programme in India, would make it easier for Delhi to put a larger number of facilities on its civilian list.

Analysts say, it would make sense for India to negotiate a separate agreement with the IAEA—referred to in the IAEA jargon as Information Circular 66—for every nuclear facility it chooses to put under international safeguards.

The existence of a weapons-oriented component in the Indian nuclear programme automatically rules out the possibility of the comprehensive safeguards arrangement called INFCIRC 153.

Under the July 18 pact, India also agreed to negotiate “an additional protocol” with the IAEA. The system of additional protocols, modeled after INFCIRC 540, were developed by the IAEA in the 1990s to ensure stronger verification of the commitments of the non-nuclear weapon states.

By definition again, this dimension of the INFCIRC 540 has no relevance to India. The only provisions of the INFCIRC 540 that will be applicable to India are the declarations on nuclear exports, which India as a responsible nuclear weapon state would be ready to undertake.

One criterion, officials have said over recent weeks, that will guide India’s decision to place a particular facility under safeguards, would be the benefit of international cooperation.

India would, however, insist that the application of safeguards on its nuclear facilities would be “prospective” not “retrospective”. In other words, IAEA safeguards should be applicable only to future activities. India would also like to ensure that safeguards would only kick in along with the initiation of international cooperation. This would require total clarity in the language of the proposed new US law on nuclear cooperation with India and the wording of the IAEA safe guards agreements.