Though the finance minister has announced a 10 per cent increase in the defence budget this year, the allocation is just a little below two per cent of the nation’s GDP. In terms of percentage of GDP that our neighbours are spending, we are not even at half their levels. So how much should be allocated for defence? Do we have a rationale? Or are defence budgets just a ritual sans clear objectives? The pattern followed over the last two decades seems to suggest that defence spending is without direction. The method apparently is to take the previous year’s allocation, allow for inflation and maybe add/subtract a little depending on the whimsical math the finance ministry undertakes to finally close figures. Curiously, this has nothing to do with the manifesto of the party in power. The Kargil war did lead to the much-needed introspection on matters of national security. Some very sound recommendations were made. Regrettably, we have floundered in their execution. Drift has settled in again. Defence budgets ought to be aimed at developing defined capabilities within specific time lines. The capabilities desired have to be derived from an assessment of possible threats as also the requirement of securing the national interest. For example, we have border issues with Pakistan and China that mandate capabilities to defend our territories. Concurrently, we must always remain poised to protect and dominate our sea lanes of communication. Besides, we must be able to combat terrorism, fight militancy and also be prepared to, if required, aid state governments to quell Naxal movements. We must have ‘on call’ forces that can be projected to protect our emerging interests beyond our borders. Today we have establishments whose primary task is to study national security and evolve strategies to secure national interests. The headless (no decision yet to appoint a chief of defence staff) Integrated Defence Staff within the ministry of defence and the National Security Advisory Board are adequately staffed for strategic planning, constantly monitoring our security envelope and determining the fund requirements for creating capabilities. The national security adviser has direct access to the PM as also to the cabinet committee on security. Then where is the problem? There could be some justification for our low levels of expenditure if we have some very secret alliances in place. Otherwise, even a casual look would suggest that our budgets and spending are grossly insufficient. Comparisons are not necessarily conclusive. Yet a brief glance at China’s defence spending can be instructive. That country, most analysts believe, is spending contrary to its claims on defence. The size of its GDP is more than two and a half times that of ours. Its focus is on rapid modernisation. If we were to couple this with the fascinating pace of infrastructure development in Tibet and the linking up of mainland China with Tibet by rail, the picture, militarily, is reasonably ominous. The timing of the Chinese posturing over Arunachal in the last couple of years requires no special analysis. If we were stronger, the Chinese would probably have been more subdued. After all, many of us believe that the Kargil adventure by the Pakistanis happened only because our forces were not potent enough to deter. Two years later, our reluctance to take any punitive action after deploying for Operation Parakrama would again suggest that among many reasons, perhaps the most important was the nagging doubt that we were not strong enough. It should be accepted that we cannot match Chinese spending dollar for dollar; nor should we try. Some very bright people among us can probably figure out smart spending but even this would have its limitations. Though we may not spend six per cent, we should not go below 3-4 per cent. This is the level of spending on defence that is widely believed to be affordable. Planning for force structuring has to, at a minimum, look at a ten-year time horizon. It takes about 2-3 years to decide the system to be procured and its desired specifications. If all goes well, another three to four years are required to invite offers analyse them, carry out trial evaluation, negotiate contracts and place orders. For major systems, deliveries can commence only after at least one year after the advance is paid. If we were to look at some of the ongoing major procurements like the Medium Range Strike Aircraft, or the helicopters or the artillery guns, the time plot has gone horribly awry. What most of us tend to forget is that acquisition alone does not mean enhancement of capability. Time has to be allowed for assimilation and absorption of each system. For instance, to train a pilot to be combat ready on a new sophisticated modern aircraft can take as much as one to two years. All the three services are currently saddled with aging equipment. Replacement programmes are running behind schedule. Weapons replacement in quite a few cases also means ammunition replacement and expenditure on ammunition is invariably many times more than the cost of the weapon. To even maintain the existing capability we need considerably higher allotments. The defence services have been clamouring for long-term commitment of funds for many years. But planning remains an annual exercise guided by the previous year’s allocation. Five year plans are made by each service headquarters, but since never formally ratified they lack the desired sanctity. It would be revealing to study the last three to four ‘five year plans’ of the three services with a view to establishing the gap between projections and allocations. Few countries in the world face the kind of security challenges that we do. Yet the irony is that despite a number of wars, including one in which we suffered a humiliating defeat and also lost considerable territory, we do not seem to have learnt many lessons. How else can anyone explain the scant attention to defence?The writer is former director general, artillery vinayshry@gmail.com
