The Indian Navy currently operates the refurbished Hermes class aircraft carrier, INS Viraat, which is due for decommissioning by 2005. Whether the Admiral Gorshkov, or any other aircraft carrier, should replace the INS Viraat is a question that demands thorough examination and public debate. This is particularly so as the costs involved are very substantial, the government’s budget deficit is at an unsustainable level, there are pressing development needs and there remain many serious gaps in the modernisation of the armed forces. The acquisition of any significant military capability must be preceded by a clear and unambiguous demonstration of the strategic and tactical necessity of such a capability. In the case of the Admiral Gorshkov, no convincing case has ever been made. An aircraft carrier is primarily a means of projecting air power beyond the reach of land-based air forces. The acquisition of an aircraft carrier must be preceded by identifying the vital interests to be defended at that range, the enemy likely to be engaged, and by demonstrating that an aircraft carrier is the most economical and militarily effective means of defending that interest. In this context, it is worthwhile remembering that in the 1980s the IAF’s shore-based aircraft had an operational range of 300 km, whereas at present, Su-30MKI operating with air-to-air refuellers have a range of well over 2,000 km i.e. covering the entire Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. India’s vital maritime interests can broadly be placed under three categories. First, it is deterring a sea-borne invasion of the mainland or the outlying islands. Second, it is ensuring the safety and security of our sea-borne trade. Finally, it is defending the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), extending 200 km from our coastline. Clearly, even without an aircraft carrier, our existing military capabilities would make a sea-borne invasion of India, or an enemy attempt to interfere with our EEZ, a futile venture. Neither Pakistan, nor China would rationally contemplate invading India by sea. The only power capable of mounting a sea-borne invasion, or sustained interference in our EEZ, is the US. Fortunately for India, the US is a friendly power. If the US were to turn hostile, the utility of one, or even half-a-dozen, Gorshkov class aircraft carriers would be close to nil. With their sensor and missile technologies, the US military would make short work of sinking a large slow moving target like an aircraft carrier. There are two vital interests that could be served by an aircraft carrier. First, to ensure the security of Indian shipping in our traditional area of influence, i.e. from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca. Second, to blockade Pakistan’s ports to disrupt her trade, economy and war-making capabilities. Operating effectively beyond this area, or attempting to disrupt the commercial shipping of a larger adversary, is not within India’s economic or technological resources. In an increasingly integrated global economy, the economies of democratic trade-dependent nations are critically dependent on each other and on sea-borne trade. By maintaining friendly relations with the Indian Ocean states (primarily Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Australia and South Africa), the naval forces of these countries, and the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR)-based US forces, far from posing a threat to India, become virtual guardians of our sea-borne trade. As we share common strategic goals with the IOR countries and the US, the rationale for acquiring the Admiral Gorshkov cannot be the need to project air power in this region. Pakistan and China are the two countries we need primarily to concern ourselves with. Although we had differences with the US during the Cold War era, surely no Indian naval planner seriously contemplates engaging the IOR-based US forces. Conflict at sea with Pakistan would be expected mainly as an extension of a major land-based war. Given its economic state and the resources consumed by its army and air force, the Pakistani Navy is unlikely to ever pose a serious threat to the Indian Navy. Already twice as large as its Pakistani counterpart, our Navy’s growing fleet and increasingly sophisticated air defence and anti-submarine capabilities make it without doubt a significantly more powerful force. India has unresolved boundary problems with China, but these are very unlikely to be settled over the high seas. The Indian Navy surely does not contemplate interfering with Chinese shipping. Equally, China’s naval forces at present do not have the capability to mount a significant challenge in the Indian Ocean; let alone the Bay of Bengal or the Arabian Sea, where our Navy and Air Force have an overwhelming advantage. If China does decide to develop forces capable of offensive operations in the IOR, India needs to co-ordinate its response with the other (more) affected countries in the IOR, as well as with the US. Given the gaps in our military capabilities, e.g. a replacement for the MiG-21, acquiring a capability to counter a non-existent threat is not justifiable. Setting aside the above arguments, let us assume that the Indian Navy does acquire the Admiral Gorshkov operating two squadrons of MiG-29K fighters. Let us further assume that our Navy and the carrier are deployed during hostilities against our key adversary i.e. Pakistan, and are committed to blockade Karachi port. The Pakistani Navy’s surface ships, sailing close to the Pakistani coast and under PAF air defence cover, will not pose a major threat to the Indian Navy. Joint naval and air force operations against the Pakistani Navy’s Harpoon-armed P-3C Orion (of which there are less than half-a-dozen), would neutralise that threat as well. The IAF can detect and attack the Orions at their land base, and while airborne, more effectively than two squadrons of carrier-based fighters. The Pakistani Navy’s Agosta submarines will likely seek out Indian Navy warships blockading the Pakistani ports, with the Indian Navy’s existing anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability equal to the threat. The carrier based MiG-29Ks will have a lower operational radius than the PAF F-16s, and to attack enemy warships and coastal installations, the carrier would have to be deployed well within the operating range of the PAF fighters. A deployment within the PAF’s range would encourage it to go all out to sink the vessel. Rather than attacking the enemy, the aircraft carrier group would be preoccupied with defending itself. If the aircraft carrier were struck and sunk, it would be a huge blow to India, and a great morale boost for Pakistan. In the aftermath, difficult questions would be raised about why a difficult-to-defend aircraft carrier was placed within the PAF’s range when the IAF, with a multi-layered air defence capability, has 35-plus squadrons for attacking the same Pakistani targets. To ensure its safety from aerial attack, the carrier would have to be based well outside the radii-of-action of the PAF’s F-16 and Mirage aircraft. The Indian Navy’s submarines are its only platform that can get close to the Pakistani coast, blockade its ports, and remain largely invulnerable to aerial attack. Based at a safe distance from the PAF, the role of the aircraft carrier becomes to provide air defence for the surface warships taking part in the blockade. As highlighted by former Navy Chief Admiral J.G. Nadkarni, there are cheaper options for providing effective air defence cover to the surface fleet. These include the indigenously built air defence ship, at a fraction (around one-third) of the US$ 1.5-2 billion price tag for the Admiral Gorshkov, and its aircraft and systems. The difference between the cost of an air defence ship and an aircraft carrier translates into a significant number of modern submarines (perhaps nuclear-powered ones) and other warships, utilising proven technologies, that would greatly enhance the offensive and defensive potential of the Indian Navy. The acquisition of the Admiral Gorshkov is justified neither by India’s strategic situation nor by the operational requirements of the Indian Navy. The author is former Air Chief Marshal, Indian Air Force
