International attention has predictably been focused in recent days on Dr A.Q. Khan’s exertions in sharing design and technological data on Pakistan’s “Islamic Bomb” with Libya, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia and even the atheistic North Koreans. It is evident that the US and its allies are going to make every effort to ensure that Pakistan’s nuclear assets remain in safe and secure hands and its military establishment behaves in a responsible manner in the future, on the transfer of nuclear weapons capabilities. But it would be naive for India to believe that merely because it has acted impeccably on nuclear exports, the Americans and others are going to be more forthcoming than they have been in either according us recognition as a nuclear weapons power or facilitating high-tech transfers.Speaking at the annual Munich Security Conference this week, National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra asserted: “You shouldn’t have any hope that India is going to sign the NPT. That is just not possible.” Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri echoed these sentiments while outlining his country’s approach to the NPT. Interestingly, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw had stated just a day earlier that the UK would “like, over time, obviously to see India in the NPT”. Just a few weeks ago, Senator John Kerry, who has now emerged as a strong presidential candidate, was asked for his views on India’s aspirations to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. He replied: “While I think that in may ways India would be a good candidate, there is one notable problem. India is not a party to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). All the nuclear powers on the Council not only directly shape the NPT, but also are parties that abide by it. This may be the most serious issue with respect to India’s candidacy and one that must be addressed by India.” It is obvious that there is no dearth of non-proliferation warriors on Kerry’s campaign staff!Kerry’s comments may well be just campaign rhetoric at this stage. But the prevalence of such sentiments in influential sections of the Democratic Party in the US cannot be ignored. Despite the much touted friendship between President Carter and Morarji Desai, virtually the entire term of the Carter Administration was spent on trying to cajole and coerce India into accepting safeguards on all its nuclear facilities and threatening to cut off supplies of nuclear fuel for the Tarapur power plant if India did not fall in line. In his book Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, Bharat Karnad has brought out the pressures that were then applied on India and the willingness of sections of the Desai Government to yield to these pressures. The Reagan Administration, was, however, far more realistic on this issue and proposed that India and the US should “amicably disengage”, with India obtaining fuel for it nuclear plant from France.While the administration of George Bush Sr followed an identical policy, India-US relations nose-dived and reached perhaps their lowest point during the first six years of Bill Clinton’s presidency. This was almost exclusively because the non-proliferation zealots in the Clinton Administration believed that they could coerce India to “cap, roll back and eliminate” its nuclear capabilities. There is little reason to believe that this mindset has significantly changed.While the Vajpayee Government deserves praise for the manner in which it has handled relations with the US, equal tribute would have to be paid to President Bush for his own strategic vision of ties with India. Apart from his healthy respect for Indian democracy, Bush clearly sees India as a partner in the entire Indian Ocean region and as an important player for strategic stability in Asia. The Bush White House has been sensitive to India’s concerns on terrorism. Differences on Iraq and trade liberalisation have not unduly clouded the relationship. But it is obvious that there is no dearth of non-proliferation zealots in the State Department even today. The ink had barely dried on the Vajpayee-Bush statement outlining a vision for cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, space, high-tech transfers and missile defence when a “senior State Department official” poured cold water on the entire “glide path” to a new strategic relationship. This “official” made it clear that no details had been agreed upon and that it would take months, if not years, for the agreement to be implemented.While there has been some progress in India-US relations in recent years, it would be unwise to claim that we have reached a stage to be regarded as “natural allies”. The Indo-US relationship cannot achieve any worthwhile potential till there is a clear understanding on where India stands in American non-proliferation perspectives. It is obvious that there can be no question of India agreeing to either “cap” or “roll back” its nuclear programme. This holds true also of Pakistan and Israel. At the same time, there can be flexibility shown by us on the issue of safeguards on nuclear installations that are being used exclusively for peaceful purposes. But, any movement in this direction will necessarily have to be predicated on a clear quid pro quo on nuclear, space and high-tech transfers. Russia and France have a far more flexible approach on such issues than the US, which remains unduly influenced by its own domestic lobbies and some non-proliferation crusaders in the European Union.Both India and the US are now too involved in their electoral processes for meaningful attention to be paid to issues affecting the nature of their long-term relationship. It is, however, imperative for them to evolve a framework that does not allow issues of nuclear and missile proliferation to constantly cloud their relationship.Henry Kissinger expressed understanding of India’s nuclear tests in May 1998, by alluding to the dangerous strategic environment in which it is located. India should be sensitive and respond positively to American concerns on the proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies. The US, in turn, will have to acknowledge that the present global architecture on non-proliferation will have to be modified to acknowledge the reality that India has come to stay as a nuclear weapons power.
