Pak N-button: US eyes on army chief’s finger

But more Pakistan changes, the more it remains the same! Monday’s meeting reversed the well-advertised but non-implemented nuclear command authority. The earlier NCA had stipulated that it would be headed by the elected Prime Minister, implying that the army chief was holding that position only temporarily till elections.

But the special session of the NCA on Monday decided that General Musharraf remains as its head and was authorised to take the decision to use nuclear weapons. The army chief would continue to control nuclear weapons as before. This may not be such a bad things except that the army itself has its share of jehadis, some of whom are sent to the ISI.

But the issue of the security and safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal had remained a source of concern not only to us but also to the US and the knowledgeable international community. In fact, when Washington applied pressure on Pakistan after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US, General Pervez Musharraf who was army chief, CEO and president — all rolled into one — had said that, among other things, the threat to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal (presumably from the US, although it could also be the jehadis) and the need to keep them secure required co-operation with the US.

The US has been more than concerned with the safety and security of nuclear weapons of Pakistan ever since that country formally went nuclear after the Chagai tests in 1998. In fact, Prof Joseph Nye, one of the leading US strategic experts and Assistant Secretary Defence in the Clinton administration, who used to forcefully advocate non-proliferation in South Asia, surprised everyone at the first meeting of the Tokyo Forum in July 1998 (set up by Japan in June) by asserting that (i) India and Pakistan were unlikely to reverse their nuclearisation, and (ii) therefore, what the international community should be concerned about was the safety of their weapons.

He had, therefore, strongly recommended that the US should provide technology like PAL (Permissive Action Links) electronic technology to help them make the weapons safer.

Concerns about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, especially their falling into the hands of terrorists, has remained. Many people believe the US has taken physical control of these weapons. This is highly unlikely since this would have caused a serious reaction in Pakistan, especially in the army. It is also unlikely that Washington would have been so seriously concerned about a nuclear conflagration in this region last year if they physically controlled Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

But it is quite possible that Islamabad agreed to accept US technology to ensure that the warheads cannot be used by anyone who does not have the necessary codes, as would be the case with PAL technology. The codes would remain with the army chief and there would be no way Prime Minister Jamali can take charge. It would remain a matter of speculation whether the US would be able to technologically monitor the location of Pakistan’s nuclear warheads if its technology is installed to make them safe.

The US turning a blind eye to a great deal of Pakistan’s policy, including its minimal co-operation in the US war against terrorism while president Bush calls Musharraf his ‘‘friend’’ and his being the best bet for the US, could be rooted in such possibility.

Massive economic assistance and a strategic relationship which legitimised Musharraf and the army rule would then be a low-cost quid pro quo for Pakistan accepting technological control over its nuclear weapons.