Pakistan must mind its periphery

Pakistan is in a state of emergency. President Pervez Musharraf terms the supra-constitutional measure a weapon against increasing Talibanisation...

Pakistan is in a state of emergency. President Pervez Musharraf terms the supra-constitutional measure a weapon against increasing Talibanisation, and he believes that the situation was made worse by unwarranted judicial and media activism. Many have argued against such justification of the emergency, but few would argue about Pakistan’s main threat. It’s not India, it’s the Taliban, stupid! For the first time in more than 30 years, Pakistan is consumed by an internal threat — a predominantly Pashtun ethnic separatist movement, which has joined forces with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda against the Pakistani military on the enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend logic. South Waziristan under Baitullah Mehsud and the Swat valley under Maulana Fazullah are shocking examples of increasing Taliban control in and outside the tribal areas.

However, Islamabad’s response to the threat is marred by contradictions; some in the intelligence, military and political communities still believe that regional security interests are better served by co-opting the Taliban to counterbalance India’s rising influence in Kabul, and possibly Kashmir. But there is also great US pressure to destroy all Taliban sanctuaries. End result: a short-term reactive posture, not a cohesive policy, towards the Taliban.

The federally administered tribal areas, surrounded by Afghanistan, NWFP and Baluchistan, provide the base for a complex and dynamic Pashtun insurgency. Since the fifties, the area has had more autonomy than any other region of Pakistan. Although federal and provincial laws do not apply to tribal areas, the Pakistan president, under the constitution (now in abeyance), can enforce certain laws through the governor of NWFP, who can then delegate ordinances to political agents. These agents, suspiciously elected on non-party basis, represent their respective agencies in both houses of parliament.

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Today more than three million people, mostly Pashtun, live in seven agencies and six smaller zones, and only 2.7 per cent of them live in urban areas. The per capita income here is much less than the national average, and close to 30 per cent of the land is inaccessible.

The fragile arrangement between the tribal areas and Islamabad was rattled by 9/11. Khurram, Khyber, North and South Waziristan agencies became the first safe havens for fleeing Al-Qaeda leaders. Pakistan withdrew support from Taliban, and deployed thousands of troops. The US provided military and financial support and promised not to attack the tribal areas unilaterally. Soon after, a wide array of military, economic and political strategies were implemented.

From 2002 to 2004, major Al-Qaeda operatives were killed or captured but the Taliban were largely ignored for geostrategic reasons vis-à-vis India. In 2005 it became increasingly evident that the Pakistani military had been asked to win a ruthless counter-insurgency with little experience and much less expertise.

Political reconciliation, the most important long-term goal, and prerequisite for any sustainable military or economic strategy, came a little too late. While local tribes killed or captured foreign terrorists, mostly Chechens and Uzbeks, after the September 2006 tribal accord with Islamabad, American air strikes and the continued presence of Pakistani troops made harmony untenable. The poppy trade provided funds and the porous Pakistan-Afghanistan border provided mobility for the Taliban. Moreover, counter-insurgency efforts were stalled by sectarian violence in the Orakzai and Kurram agencies. By November the Pakistani army’s morale had hit an all-time low when more than 300 soldiers deserted or were captured.

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What can be done? The current dismal situation places high expectations on the next Pakistani government. A new multi-faceted Taliban policy is needed that reflects the lessons learnt. In the short term, the US and Pakistani militaries must seal the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and cut arms and drug routes to and from tribal areas. Second, a new jirga of tribal elders and warlords must be called. The message should be emphatically clear: the writ of the state is supreme, and pending a constitutional amendment, all living in the tribal areas are equal citizens of the republic. Third, political agents must not be simply replaced by those that favour Islamabad but by a whole new set of popular and well-respected political representatives. Fourth, military and political strategy must work in tandem with the socio-economic renewal of the tribal areas.

All of this must be achieved pragmatically and at times simultaneously with the looming fear of a major blowback — increased troop casualties and suicide attacks in major cities. To avoid failure Islamabad and Washington should focus their policies on the fundamental reality that the tribal areas are part of Pakistan, and the Pashtuns despite their desire for more autonomy are Pakistanis.

The writer researches American foreign policy towards South Asia in Washington DC