Panicky officers added to Himalayan blunder at Kargil

Senior Army officers of the Leh-headquartered 3 Mountain Division and Kargil-headquartered 121 Infantry Brigade panicked and pushed troops in almost blindly. Infantry formations were given orders and an assessment of the enemy that seems in hindsight disastrous: “Go up, catch the 6-7 poorly-equipped militant infiltrators by the scruff of their necks and bring them down.” The result: Troops were mowed down like flies in those early suicidal assaults.

The first two weeks after the intrusions were detected — between May 6 and 10 — turned out to be a nightmare for troops rushed overnight from counter-insurgency operations in the Valley and launched into “disorganised scrambles”that left many wounded and dead.

By the third and fourth week of May, two battalions of the Grenadiers and the Naga Regiment had run up massive casualties when ordered by senior officers of the Leh and Kargil command to assault an enemy whose dimensions were dimly known.

“Officers were given a tongue-lashing by the higher command for allegedly chickening out and failing to muster enough courage to enter into assault at the heights. They were told that there were a few infiltrators, who were probably surplus from infiltration into the Valley, were poorly-equipped and would either turn tail and run back to PoK or fall after a brief fight,” recalls a senior field commander.

With the junior officers arguing that the enemy’s contours should be properly assessed before mounting assaults, these objections were quickly overruled by the Leh higher command, keen to “finish off the infiltration” before Army HQs and other tiers in the chain of command asking too many uncomfortable questions.

The troops weretold it would be a cakewalk for them because the infiltrators would soon run out of ammunition.

However, the Nagas ran up more than 80 wounded and dead in the first few days when they climbed the Tololing Ridge. They were fired at from many directions, the intruders were far too motivated to run away and seemed well-stocked with ammunition and supplies.

“This was bound to happen because troops were ordered to take Point 4590 (which later took weeks to fall) in just one night. Without proper equipment and clothing, they were sent out on a 72-hour operation to mop up the infiltrators. Troops not only ran up battle casualties because of unexpected volumes of fire but five to six of them also fell ill because of weather-related illnesses,” said an infantry officer who was later to lead a successful assault.

Fortunately, some officers leading the troops were not swayed by the “assurances” of the higher command of the 3 Mountain Division and the 121 Infantry Brigade. “We approached the heights only atnight and during bad weather. When 300-400 yards from the heights, speculative fire was opened using rocket launchers, mortars and LMGs. Fortunately, the enemy responded and betrayed all his positions. Often, opening lethal fire from unknown positions and causing casualties to the jawans’ side was the only way of determining the exact location of the intruders,” said an infantry officer.